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R i c h a r d  p r i m u s   
 
The Limits of Enumeration 
abstract.  According to a well-known principle of constitutional interpretation here identi-
fied as the “internal-limits canon,” the powers of Congress must always be construed as author-
izing less legislation than a general police power would. This Article argues that the internal-
limits canon is unsound. Whether the powers of Congress would in practice authorize any legis-
lation that a police power would authorize is a matter of contingency: it depends on the relation-
ship between the powers and the social world at a given time. There is no reason why, at a given 
time, the powers cannot turn out to authorize any legislation that a police power would. This 
Article explains why setting aside the internal-limits canon is consistent with the interests of fed-
eralism, with fidelity to the Founding design, and with the text of the Constitution. 
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“The enumeration presupposes something not enumerated.” 
  —Chief Justice John Marshall, Gibbons v. Ogden1 
The federal government is a government of limited and enumerated pow-
ers. Every law student learns this formula. And so close on its heels that it 
sometimes seems to be the same idea, another principle follows: there are 
things Congress cannot do, even without reference to affirmative prohibitions 
like those in the Bill of Rights. For ease of reference, we can call the first idea 
the enumeration principle, and, for reasons to be explained just below, we can 
call the second idea the internal-limits canon. So long as it is properly under-
stood, the enumeration principle is a sound tenet of American constitutional 
law. But the internal-limits canon is not. The purpose of this Article is to ex-
plain why the internal-limits canon, for all its familiarity and broad acceptance, 
is wrong. 
In referring to the idea under consideration as the internal-limits canon, I 
draw on a useful typology that divides limits on congressional power into three 
kinds.2 Internal limits are the boundaries of Congress’s powers taken on their 
own terms. For example, the power to govern the District of Columbia3 can be 
used to write a fire code for the District of Columbia, but it cannot be used to 
write a fire code for Delaware. This limit is “internal” to the power itself, 
meaning that the limit inheres in the definition of the power. External limits, in 
contrast, are affirmative prohibitions that prevent Congress from doing things 
that would otherwise be permissible exercises of its powers. Thus, the  
Fifteenth Amendment prevents Congress from conducting whites-only elec-
tions in the District of Columbia, despite Congress’s power to govern the Dis-
trict. The rule against racial discrimination in voting is not conceptually part of 
the power to govern the District; before the adoption of the Fifteenth Amend-
ment, Congress could use that power to conduct racially restrictive elections. 
The Fifteenth Amendment creates a separate constitutional rule that pushes 
back against the grant of power and thus limits that power “externally.”4 Final-
 
1. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 195 (1824). 
2. See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 297 (2d ed. 1988). 
3. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17. 
4. The content of particular external limits is thus not determined by the answers to questions 
like, “Does this legislation constitute governance of the District of Columbia?”, “Does this 
legislation regulate interstate commerce?”, or “Does this legislation define or punish pira-
cy?” Instead, external limits are analyzed with questions like, “Does this legislation abridge 
the freedom of speech?” or “Is this law a bill of attainder?” 
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ly, there are process limits, such as the bicameral legislature, the requirement of 
presidential presentment, and frequent democratic elections. Unlike external 
limits, process limits do not place particular substantive outcomes wholly out 
of reach. But they raise the cost of federal action, thus diminishing the likeli-
hood that Congress will do any particular thing, especially any particular thing 
that might arouse substantial opposition.5 
Process limits and external limits are consequential forces constraining 
modern federal governance. Internal limits are not. Indeed, for much of the 
twentieth century, many people suspected that internal limits had lost all prac-
tical significance.6 Judicial doctrine constrained Congress on the basis of pro-
hibitions like those in the Bill of Rights, but broad constructions of the Com-
merce Clause made it hard to identify enforceable limits on Congress short of 
those affirmative prohibitions.7 At the level of principle, though, the idea that 
the Constitution demands a meaningful set of internal limits lived on.8  
Defenders of federal statutes have always needed to answer the question, “If 
Congress can do that, what can’t Congress do, other than the things the Consti-
tution specifically forbids?”9 That question played a famously large role in Na-
tional Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius (NFIB).10 And in the wake of 
 
5. See, e.g., Bradford R. Clark, Separation of Powers as a Safeguard of Federalism, 79 TEX. L. REV. 
1321 (2001). 
6. See, e.g., Pamela S. Karlan, The Supreme Court, 2011 Term—Foreword: Democracy and Disdain, 
126 HARV. L. REV. 1, 42-43 (2012) (surveying this suspicion between the 1940s and the 
1990s); Gil Seinfeld, Article I, Article III, and the Limits of Enumeration, 108 MICH. L. REV. 
1389, 1391 (2010) (identifying the idea that internal limits lack practical force as “the stand-
ard story”). 
7. See, e.g., RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF 
LIBERTY 318 (rev. ed. 2014) (describing near-plenary congressional power as the practical 
consequence of prevailing doctrine); see also Lawrence B. Solum, How NFIB v. Sebelius Af-
fects the Constitutional Gestalt, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 1, 3 n.9 (2013) (collecting many expres-
sions of this view). 
8. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, The Proper Scope of the Commerce Power, 73 VA. L. REV. 1387 
(1987) (insisting on the continued validity of the principle); Donald H. Regan, How to 
Think About the Federal Commerce Power and Incidentally Rewrite United States v. Lopez, 94 
MICH. L. REV. 554 (1995) (taking the idea of a limiting enumeration as a longstanding prin-
ciple worthy of continued respect). 
9. See, e.g., Oral Argument at 4:52, United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (No. 93-1260) 
(“If . . . Congress can reach under the interstate commerce power, what would be an exam-
ple of a case which you couldn’t reach?”), http://www.oyez.org/api/media/sites/default/files 
/audio/cases/1994/93-1260_19941108-argument.mp3 [http://perma.cc/J7YM-V5GJ]. 
10. 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (upholding the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, 
Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) [hereinafter ACA] (codified as amended in scat-
tered sections of 42 U.S.C.)); see JEFFREY TOOBIN, THE OATH 272-82 (2012) (describing the 
role of the internal-limits canon in the struggle over the ACA). 
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NFIB, constitutional lawyers wonder whether the internal-limits canon—that 
is, the principle that the powers of Congress must be construed as meaningful-
ly constrained by internal limits—might be deployed in seriously consequential 
ways.11 
Now is the time, therefore, for a frontal debunking of the internal-limits 
canon. It is my aim in this Article to show, despite longstanding orthodoxy to 
the contrary, that Congress’s powers might in practice authorize the enactment 
of any legislation that would be justified by a grant of general regulatory au-
thority. “Might” is an important part of the claim. In my view, whether the 
powers of Congress have as great a scope in practice as a general police power 
is a matter of contingency, not a matter of principle. The question can only be 
answered by examining the powers and applying them sensibly to the social 
world. But in the course of that analysis, no constitutional principle bars the 
conclusion that Congress’s enumerated powers in practice authorize as much as 
a police power would. 
Measured by the conventions of constitutional discourse, rejecting the in-
ternal-limits canon would be a radical step. A familiar trope among constitu-
tional lawyers would deem it an obvious mistake. “Of course the powers of 
Congress are inherently limiting,” this argument says. “After all, the powers of 
Congress are specifically enumerated in the Constitution. If Congress had gen-
eral legislative power, the Constitution would have said that, rather than 
providing a list of particular powers. That’s what Chief Justice John Marshall 
meant in Gibbons v. Ogden when he said that the enumeration presupposes 
something not enumerated.”12  
Now it happens that this familiar way of invoking Marshall’s Gibbons dic-
tum may not get the great Chief Justice quite right, in part because it misses a 
nuance in the word “presupposes.”13 But more importantly, it isn’t true that 
 
11. See Karlan, supra note 6, at 63-64 (noting uncertainty about whether the commerce and 
spending powers will meaningfully contract after NFIB’s strong signal of the Court’s will-
ingness to limit legislation); Solum, supra note 7, at 37-38 (suggesting that Wickard v. Fil-
burn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942), is now a contestable case). 
12. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 196 (1824) (“The enumeration presupposes 
something not enumerated.”); see also Regan, supra note 8, at 556 (“The mere fact of an 
enumeration of powers makes it clear that the federal government’s powers are meant to be 
limited.”). 
13. Presupposing a condition differs from requiring that the condition be treated as true. See 
infra Part IV.B. It is also worth noting that Chief Justice Marshall was referring to the enu-
meration of three types of commerce within Article I, Section 8, Clause 3, not the enumera-
tion of powers from Clause 1 through Clause 18 of Section 8. See Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 196. 
Perhaps Chief Justice Marshall’s assertion about the particular presuppositions of the enu-
meration in Clause 3 implies parallel presuppositions about the enumeration in all of Section 
8—or, more to the point, for the enumeration of Congress’s powers throughout the whole 
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enumerations of specific authorities are always more limiting than general au-
thorizations would be. Yes, specific lists are probably specific for a reason, at 
least most of the time, and “Congress can do these eighteen things”14 might 
seem like a funny way of authorizing Congress to legislate however it thinks 
best, subject to the limits of the political process and the affirmative prohibi-
tions specified elsewhere in the Constitution. But as a conceptual rule, the 
claim that enumerated authorizations are always more limiting in practice than 
general authorizations is too sweeping. Consider this example: is “you can have 
chocolate, vanilla, or strawberry ice cream for dessert” more limiting in practice 
than the general authorization “you can have ice cream for dessert”? The an-
swer on any given day might be yes or it might be no. It depends on the con-
tents of the freezer.15 
Obviously this enumeration differs from the Article I enumeration in many 
ways, but it should bring the basic point into view: whether a list of specific 
authorizations is in practice more limiting than a general authorization de-
pends on facts about that particular enumeration and the circumstances in 
which it is applied. So the mere fact that the Constitution includes an enumera-
tion of congressional powers cannot demonstrate that the internal limits of 
those powers leave Congress unable to regulate something that a police power 
would let Congress reach. If the powers of Congress must be construed as col-
lectively less extensive than a police power, it has to be for some other reason. 
Prevailing constitutional opinion furnishes three such reasons, sounding in 
the traditional categories of text, history, and structure. As a textual matter, the 
argument runs, Article I and the Tenth Amendment both indicate that the 
enumerated powers are internally limited.16 Historically, the Founders saw the 
 
Constitution. But perhaps not; different enumerations may have different presuppositions. 
For examples of enumerations that do not presuppose things unenumerated, see infra Part 
IV.B. 
14. Eighteen is the number of power-conferring clauses in Article I, Section 8. It is worth re-
membering, though, that the Constitution confers power on Congress in many places other 
than that section. For example, the power to decide the manner of elections for the House of 
Representatives is conferred in Article I, Section 4, and the power to make rules respecting 
the property and territory of the United States is specified in Article IV, Section 3. Counting 
conservatively, the original Constitution contains eleven clauses granting power to Congress 
outside the enumeration in Article I, Section 8; the amended Constitution contains twenty-
five. So although it may make sense to regard the powers affirmatively delegated by the 
Constitution as exclusive, it is not straightforward to think of the list in Section 8 as indicat-
ing that exclusivity. (The Tenth Amendment is a better choice as support for that proposi-
tion.) 
15. For other examples, see infra Part IV. 
16. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 585-89 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) (argu-
ing that affording Congress the equivalent of plenary power would make nonsense of Article 
 
  
the yale law journal 124:576   20 14  
582 
 
enumeration as a device for limiting Congress.17 Structurally, a federal police 
power would let Congress eclipse the state governments and destroy the feder-
al system.18 These arguments have some plausibility, and they enjoy a long 
pedigree in constitutional thought. But on their merits, they are less than com-
pelling. 
The textual grounding for the internal-limits canon, I suggest, is powerful 
if one already believes that congressional power must be internally limited. But 
without that presumption, the text is more easily read to permit Congress’s 
enumerated powers to go wherever they might lead.19 As a matter of history, 
most of the Founders did see enumeration as a strategy for limiting (and invig-
orating) the federal government. But enumerating the powers of Congress was 
only one of the Founders’ strategies for limiting federal power, and fidelity to 
their design does not require forcing that strategy to do the job if it does not 
work very well and other constitutional strategies are more up to the task.20 Fi-
nally, the federal structure of American government has long been maintained 
not by internal limits on Congress’s powers but by a combination of external 
limits, process limits, and the practical conditions that shape interactions be-
tween federal and state officials.21 There is no reason to believe that these de-
vices deliver optimal federalism, partly because there is no reason to believe that 
any set of tools could yield that outcome. But there is also no reason to think 
that a better brand of federalism would result if some consequential set of in-
ternal limits were added to the mix. In sum, internal limits are not mandated 
by the text of the Constitution, not required by fidelity to the Founding, and 
neither necessary nor materially helpful for promoting federalism. 
So am I saying that Congress is authorized to do whatever it wants? Of 
course not. For one thing, the whole panoply of external constitutional limits is 
firmly in place. Congress may not establish Christianity,22 abolish jury trial,23 
 
I, Section 8); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (describing the Tenth 
Amendment as indicating that the enumerated powers of Congress are inherently limited); 
Regan, supra note 8, at 556. The Tenth Amendment may also be a source of external limits. 
See infra Part IV. 
17. See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius (NFIB), 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2577-78 (2012) (in-
voking this Founding attitude); BARNETT, supra note 7, at 277 (same). 
18. See, e.g., NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2578 (describing the enumeration as limiting the scope of federal 
power to something narrower than state power, thus promoting the benefits of federalism). 
19. See infra Part IV. 
20. See infra Part III. 
21. See infra Part II. See generally Larry Kramer, Understanding Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1485 
(1994) (analyzing the significance of these forces to the operation of American federalism).  
22. U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion 
. . . .”). 
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commandeer a state legislature,24 or unilaterally combine the two Carolinas in-
to a single state.25 Nor am I arguing that the commerce power (or the union of 
that power and the rest of Congress’s powers) authorizes all possible legisla-
tion except what the external limits prohibit. In other words, I am not arguing 
that the Constitution confers the equivalent of plenary power on Congress. It 
might, or it might not, depending on the best constructions of many different 
powers and the relationship between those powers and the social world at any 
given time. My argument takes no position on whether the Constitution au-
thorizes Congress to do whatever a national government with a police power 
could do. Instead, my argument is that the answer to that question is a matter 
of contingency, rather than a categorical “no.” In the course of analyzing the 
scope of any congressional power, I contend, one should not exclude an other-
wise reasonable construction on the grounds that it would leave Congress con-
strained only by process limits and affirmative prohibitions.26 
My argument also says nothing about the wisdom, as opposed to the per-
missibility, of federal legislation. State and local decision making is often better 
than central decision making, and Congress is often well advised to leave issues 
in the hands of local officials. Indeed, it might be sensible to say that Congress 
should prefer local decision making except where some reason suggests that 
regulation be federal, albeit on the understanding that there are many reasons 
why federal regulation is sometimes the right choice.27 States today exercise a 
great deal of consequential governing authority. That is a healthy condition, 
and for reasons explained in this Article it would remain the case even if the in-
ternal-limits canon disappeared. So the argument here is not that all law 
should be federal, nor even that more law should be federal than currently is. 
Congress should consider the virtues of local decision making before enacting 
 
23. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (“The Trial of all Crimes . . . shall be by Jury.”). 
24. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992). 
25. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3. 
26. Note that “affirmative” here does not mean “affirmatively specified in the text.” It means 
affirmative in the same sense as “affirmative defenses” elsewhere in the law. An external lim-
it, like an affirmative defense, operates in the presence of a prima facie reason for going the 
other way. That is, even where some enumerated power of Congress would otherwise au-
thorize federal legislation, an external limit blocks the exercise of that power, just as an af-
firmative defense blocks a plaintiff or a prosecutor from making out an otherwise successful 
legal case. Many external limits are indeed specified in the text; depending on how capa-
ciously one reads the text and how willingly one rejects principles that do not seem textual, 
the total proportion of external limits that is textually specified might be higher or lower. 
But the textuality vel non of a constitutional rule is orthogonal to the issue of whether it is 
an external limit. 
27. Cf. Regan, supra note 8 (developing a similar view). 
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legislation, and judges should disallow laws that violate principles of federal-
ism by contravening external constitutional limits on congressional power, 
some of which are associated with the Tenth Amendment.28 But the worry that 
sustaining a given law would make it impossible to identify meaningful internal 
limits on congressional power is not a sufficient reason to deem that law inva-
lid. 
These limitations on the scope of my argument should not conceal the im-
portance of rejecting the internal-limits canon. As noted above, constitutional 
practice long featured a disjuncture between the official theory of a limiting 
enumeration and a de facto settlement whereby internal limits did virtually 
nothing to constrain federal law.29 From the New Deal until United States v. 
Lopez30 and United States v. Morrison,31 the Supreme Court enforced no internal 
limits. Even after Lopez and Morrison, workarounds like the reenacted Gun-
Free School Zones Act32 and the Court’s decision in Gonzales v. Raich33 seemed 
to indicate that Congress could pursue pretty much any regulatory project for 
which it had the political will, assuming no transgression of external constitu-
tional limits. Some commentators saw the practical reality of plenary congres-
sional power as cause for alarm,34 and others regarded it as far less troubling.35 
But even thinkers basically content to let Congress exercise general legislative 
power have been mostly inclined to let that arrangement persist as a fact in ten-
sion with official norms, rather than offering direct justificatory arguments in 
its support based on traditional sources of constitutional authority.36 More or 
 
28. I use the phrase “associated with” because the text of the Tenth Amendment, read literally, 
does not announce external limits. It specifies the consequences of internal ones. Nonethe-
less, the Amendment is often used as a placeholder for external limits. See infra Part IV. 
29. See supra notes 6-11 and accompanying text. 
30. 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (striking down the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990). 
31. 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (striking down the civil remedy of the Violence Against Women Act of 
1994). 
32. Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) 
(2012)) (criminalizing the possession within a school zone of “a firearm that has moved in or 
that otherwise affects interstate or foreign commerce”). 
33. 545 U.S. 1 (2005) (upholding the application of the Controlled Substances Act based on the 
Commerce Clause against an individual growing marijuana for non-commercial use). 
34. See, e.g., BARNETT, supra note 7; Edward S. Corwin, The Passing of Dual Federalism, 36 VA. L. 
REV. 1 (1950); Epstein, supra note 8. 
35. See, e.g., Kramer, supra note 21, at 1496-1503. 
36. See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf, Incidental Burdens on Fundamental Rights, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1175, 
1192 (1996) (saying that as a practical matter the federal government now enjoys nearly ple-
nary power but not offering interpretive arguments justifying that arrangement); Karlan, 
supra note 6, at 43. 
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less across the ideological spectrum, theorists and practitioners offer at least 
pro forma affirmation of the internal-limits canon.37 As a result, the canon has 
persisted as a stock idea in constitutional law. To paraphrase Justice Robert 
Jackson, it lies about like a loaded weapon.38 
So long as mainstream constitutional decision makers lacked the inclination 
to invalidate important federal legislation on internal-limits grounds, this con-
sensus at the level of principle had little significance at the level of practice. But 
in the controversy over the Affordable Care Act (ACA),39 the internal-limits 
canon threatened to become the vehicle for an enormously consequential statu-
tory invalidation—one that would in principle have been subject to a worka-
round but which in practice would have killed a major legislative program.40 
Critics of the ACA demanded to know what Congress couldn’t do, short of by-
passing external limits, if the individual mandate was valid law.41 Supporters of 
the ACA lacked the option of saying, “Well, maybe nothing, and that’s all 
right.” That response would have identified the ACA’s supporters as constitu-
tional heretics. But it shouldn’t have: the internal-limits canon is not entitled to 
the persuasive force it now enjoys. 
In the post-NFIB world, it is important to explain why not, lest the canon 
facilitate the invalidation of important legislation that should rightfully be 
deemed constitutional. To be sure, it hasn’t happened yet. NFIB upheld the Af-
fordable Care Act, and the internal-limits canon might still continue its long 
career of solemn invocations followed by little or nothing in the way of conse-
quences. But in the wake of NFIB, some mainstream constitutional thinkers 
have begun reviving old ideas about internal limits.42 The question of whether 
we stand on the brink of a constitutional gestalt shift has been squarely 
 
37. See, e.g., Adam B. Cox & Cristina M. Rodríguez, The President and Immigration Law, 119 
YALE L.J. 458, 469 (2009); John F. Manning, Federalism and the Generality Problem in Consti-
tutional Interpretation, 122 HARV. L. REV. 2003, 2004-05 (2009); Gillian E. Metzger, Congress, 
Article IV, and Interstate Relations, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1468, 1513 (2007). 
38. Cf. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 246 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (“The 
principle then lies about like a loaded weapon . . . .”). 
39. 42 U.S.C. §§ 18001 et seq. (2012). 
40. The relevant workarounds are possible only when the political branches desire to reinstate 
the substance of the invalidated legislation. See infra Part I. With a Republican majority in 
the House, Congress in 2012 would not have passed another statute reproducing the policy 
of the ACA. 
41. See generally TOOBIN, supra note 10 (chronicling the role of this question in the NFIB litiga-
tion). 
42. See, e.g., Barry Friedman & Genevieve Lakier, “To Regulate,” Not “To Prohibit”: Limiting the 
Commerce Power, 2012 SUP. CT. REV. 255 (2012) (proposing that the commerce power be con-
strued as not conferring the power to shut down a given interstate market). 
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posed.43 In the next phase of discussions about federal power, the widespread 
sense that everyone accepts the internal-limits canon will distort the analysis 
and tilt the playing field. To prevent that distortion, it is important for theo-
rists and practitioners to recognize that traditional sources of constitutional au-
thority might, as a practical matter, authorize Congress to make any law not 
prohibited by some external limit—and that such a conclusion should not be 
worrisome. 
In Part I of this Article, I lay out the logic of the internal-limits canon. In 
Part II, I explain why federalism does not require congressional power to be 
internally limited. In Part III, I explain why fidelity to the Founding does not 
require the internal-limits canon. In Part IV, I explain why the text of the Con-
stitution does not require it either. 
Finally, a comment on the Article’s organization. Constitutional analyses 
standardly discuss arguments from text, history, and structure in precisely that 
order: text, history, structure. The body of this Article deliberately reverses the 
sequence: structure, history, text. The point of this unconventional ordering is 
to enable readers to assess my analysis of the Constitution’s text with a clear 
understanding of the structural and historical analyses that make the textual 
reading sensible. After all, constitutional interpreters generally (and reasona-
bly) read ambiguous texts so as to render them sensible in light of considera-
tions about history and structure. An interpreter’s sense of the relevant history 
and structure will push him toward some possible readings of text rather than 
others. Indeed, a textual reading that seems natural or intuitive given one set of 
assumptions about history and structure might seem forced and implausible 
given another set. In the past, when interpreters have overwhelmingly read the 
Constitution’s text to support the internal-limits canon, they have not done so 
on the basis of the text simpliciter; they have done so while approaching the text 
through a set of assumptions about history and structure. In what follows, I lay 
out a structural account of the role of internal limits within American federal-
ism and a historical account of internal limits in the Founding design; both ac-
counts are intended to correct prevailing misconceptions. With better under-
standings of history and structure, a better reading of the text comes more 
clearly into view. 
 
43. See Solum, supra note 7, at 2 (stating that NFIB destabilized the regnant “constitutional ge-
stalt”). 
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i .  two ideas 
A. The Enumeration Principle 
The Constitution’s enumeration of congressional powers is generally asso-
ciated with the project of ensuring a federal government that is vigorous but 
limited. The virtues of limited government as a general matter have been ex-
tensively catalogued, and there is little need to offer a comprehensive recapitu-
lation here. Briefly, limited government at both the local and the national level 
is necessary for individual liberty and for the many forms of human flourishing 
that individual liberty enables.44 Limitations on central power in particular pre-
serve space for meaningful autonomy at the state and local levels and therefore 
for a range of benefits that the literature on federalism has made familiar.45 The 
constitutional system accordingly needs to consider which decisions should be 
made centrally and which should be made locally, as well as what limits there 
are to what any government may do. 
Enumerating congressional powers was one of several Founding-era strate-
gies for pursuing these ends. The foremost strategy was that of process limits, 
which is to say that the whole structure of power and office-holding that the 
Constitution created is properly understood as a set of devices for constraining 
the federal government as well as empowering it. For example, frequent elec-
tions were expected to keep Congress from enacting oppressive legislation, and 
a Senate composed of ambassadors from the state legislatures was expected to 
ensure that the federal government respected the prerogatives of state govern-
ments. The Founders also made use of external limits: both in the original 
Constitution and in the Bill of Rights, they specified affirmative prohibitions 
that Congress could not transgress.46 And most relevant for purposes of the 
present discussion, the Founders deployed a strategy of internal limits by 
 
44. Some collectivist theories (Rousseau’s, perhaps, or certain forms of modern socialism) may 
point in a different direction, but to the extent that they do, they lie outside the liberal tradi-
tion from which American constitutional thought grows. See generally LOUIS HARTZ, THE 
LIBERAL TRADITION IN AMERICA: AN INTERPRETATION OF AMERICAN POLITICAL THOUGHT 
SINCE THE REVOLUTION (1955). It may also be worth noting that the recognition that limited 
government is conducive to individual liberty need not deny that governance is sometimes 
liberty-enhancing. Government and liberty are not always opponents in a zero-sum game. 
See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 27-28 (1961) (describing laws that facilitate and ex-
tend the power of the people to whom they apply—for example, laws making it possible to 
enter into enforceable contracts or to dispose of property by will—rather than limiting their 
freedom). 
45. See infra notes 72-77 and accompanying text. 
46. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9; id. amend. I. 
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providing that Congress would have only those powers affirmatively given to 
it. If Congress has only particular powers, the intuition runs, then its jurisdic-
tion is narrower than if it possessed a general police power.  
The idea that Congress has only those powers that are affirmatively given 
to it is fundamental in constitutional law, and constitutional lawyers typically 
invoke that idea by saying that the federal government is a government of 
enumerated powers. But there is some uncertainty about whether the best in-
terpretation of the enumeration principle understands the phrase “enumerated 
powers” literally or as a term of art. In a literal sense, the “enumerated powers” 
of Congress are those listed in Article I, Section 8, as well as those listed in 
many other parts of the Constitution.47 It is commonly said that Congress can 
act only on the basis of its enumerated powers.48 But constitutional practice has 
been more complex, because the Supreme Court has periodically recognized 
congressional powers arising implicitly from the constitutional structure rather 
than from any express grant of particular authority. Examples include implicit 
powers in foreign affairs,49 the now-defunct power to enforce the Fugitive 
Slave Clause,50 and, at the limit, the power to do all things necessary to protect 
the federal government from destruction.51 If these examples and others like 
them are to be taken seriously, then the frequent statement that Congress can 
act only on the basis of its enumerated powers should be understood, if not as 
an error, then either as an approximation or as a statement that uses the term 
“enumerated” in a non-literal way—perhaps as a synonym for “delegated,” ra-
ther than a synonym for “articulated expressly.”52 If so, it is more accurate to 
say that Congress can act only on the basis of its delegated powers, which is a 
 
47. Consider, for example, the Full Faith and Credit Clause, id. art. IV, § 1, and the power to 
enforce the Fourteenth Amendment, id. amend. XIV, § 5. 
48. See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius (NFIB), 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2577 (2012) (“If no 
enumerated power authorizes Congress to pass a certain law, that law may not be enacted  
. . . .”). 
49. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 316 (1936) (discussing implicit 
congressional powers in foreign affairs). 
50. Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 615-22 (1842) (discussing implicit congressional 
power to enforce the Fugitive Slave Clause). 
51. See Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457, 535 (1870) (“[I]n the judgment of those who 
adopted the Constitution, there were powers created by it, neither expressly specified nor 
deducible from any one specified power, or ancillary to it alone, but which grew out of the 
aggregate of powers conferred upon the government, or out of the sovereignty instituted.”). 
52. See Evan H. Caminker, “Appropriate” Means-Ends Constraints on Section 5 Powers, 53 STAN. L. 
REV. 1127, 1135 (2001) (analyzing the gap between the enumerated powers and the full set of 
congressional powers under the Constitution). 
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larger set than its enumerated powers.53 Note that the Tenth Amendment speaks 
this language: it reserves the “powers not delegated to the United States,” not 
the “powers not enumerated.”54 
Someone adhering to a stronger form of the enumeration principle—
whether due to a theory of textualism, a commitment to limiting Congress, a 
sense of fealty to a traditional maxim of constitutional law, or any combination 
of these and other factors—could of course deny that Congress has ever legiti-
mately exercised unenumerated powers. Most simply, all the cases recognizing 
such powers might be dismissed as wrongly decided. But it is not necessary to 
go that far. The less destabilizing alternative is to argue that the powers the 
Court has described as implicit rather than enumerated really are contained 
within the enumerated powers, correctly understood.55 For example, the power 
to safeguard presidential elections, treated as an implicit congressional power 
 
53. Even this modification may not capture all of the Court’s analyses. In Curtiss-Wright, for 
example, the Court opined that certain powers inherent in sovereignty or nationhood be-
long to the federal government even independent of the Constitution. 299 U.S. at 315-18; see 
also Sarah H. Cleveland, Powers Inherent in Sovereignty: Indians, Aliens, Territories, and the 
Nineteenth Century Origins of Plenary Power over Foreign Affairs, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1 (2002) (cat-
aloging powers that the Supreme Court has at various times recognized as belonging to 
Congress on the basis of general principles of national sovereignty—rather than on the basis 
of any particular provisions of the Constitution). 
54. U.S. CONST. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitu-
tion, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the Peo-
ple.”). Close readers of the text have long argued that the wording of the Tenth Amendment 
falsifies, rather than confirms, the idea that the Amendment limits the federal government 
to those powers specifically enumerated in the Constitution, and for two reasons. First, the 
Tenth Amendment’s reference to “powers not delegated by the Constitution to the United 
States” stands in contrast with Article II of the Articles of Confederation, which reserved to 
the states every power not “expressly delegated to the United States.” ARTICLES OF CONFED-
ERATION of 1781, art. II (emphasis added). The omission of the word “expressly” from the 
Tenth Amendment has sometimes been taken to mean that not all of the Constitution’s del-
egations of power to the federal government are made in express terms. See, e.g., M’Culloch 
v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 406 (1819). Second, a reading proffered long ago by 
Christopher Tiedeman argues for the same conclusion by reasoning from the Amendment’s 
reference to powers “prohibited to the states.” As Tiedeman explained, the Tenth Amend-
ment specifically recognizes a category of powers—those prohibited to the states—that do 
not fall within the category of powers reserved to the states because not delegated to the 
United States. Nothing in the Tenth Amendment indicates that powers prohibited to the 
states are also prohibited to the United States. Therefore, Tiedeman reasoned, if a power is 
prohibited to the states but logically must be a power that can be exercised by someone in 
government, it follows that the power in question belongs to the United States, despite its 
not having been enumerated. See CHRISTOPHER G. TIEDEMAN, THE UNWRITTEN CONSTITU-
TION OF THE UNITED STATES 137-43 (1890). 
55. See Richard Primus, Unbundling Constitutionality, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 1079, 1098 n.45 (2013).  
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in Burroughs v. United States,56 could be reinterpreted as a power necessary and 
proper for carrying into execution all of the functions of the President as con-
ferred in Article II and therefore as falling within the power enumerated in the 
Necessary and Proper Clause.57 Such an effort, if comprehensive and persua-
sive, might collapse the distinction between enumerated and delegated powers, 
at least in the present, and perhaps also in the future, if that mode of thinking 
persisted. It would of course remain the case that, as a historical matter, consti-
tutional decision makers have not categorically limited the powers of Congress 
to those that they believed to be enumerated in the Constitution.58 But it is al-
ways open to supporters of a strict enumerated-powers doctrine to say that the 
Court has sometimes stumbled. Or, more charitably, that the Justices who 
purported to recognize unenumerated powers actually builded better than they 
knew,59 deciding cases correctly even while not quite articulating the reasons 
why. On that interpretation, the enumeration principle is literal and straight-
forward: Congress simply may not do anything that does not fall within the 
powers expressly given to it by the text of the Constitution. 
 
56. 290 U.S. 534, 544-49 (1934). 
57. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 1, 18 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . which shall be neces-
sary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vest-
ed by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or 
Officer thereof.”). Note that, if the internal-limits canon is valid, it affects the Necessary and 
Proper Clause in the same way that it affects every other power-conferring clause, that is, by 
forbidding a construction so broad that the clause (whether alone or in combination with 
other powers) gives Congress the equivalent of a police power. 
58. John Mikhail has recently argued in considerable depth that key constitutional drafters, 
chiefly James Wilson, intended the Necessary and Proper Clause to indicate that the Consti-
tution delegates more powers to the federal government than it expressly enumerates. See 
John Mikhail, The Necessary and Proper Clauses, 102 GEO. L.J. 1045 (2014). In Mikhail’s ac-
count, Wilson and others (including some of the Constitution’s leading opponents) under-
stood the Clause’s reference to “all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Govern-
ment of the United States” to mean not “all powers enumerated in parts of the Constitution 
other than Article I, Section 8,” but rather “all powers that this Constitution vests in the 
Government of the United States implicitly rather than expressly.” See id. at 1045-57, 1121-
30. But even if modern constitutional interpretation were to be guided by Mikhail’s account, 
nothing would necessarily follow about the internal-limits canon. Even if Congress can ex-
ercise powers other than those enumerated, it need not follow that Congress’s powers are as 
broad in practice as a police power would be. 
59. Cf. Ralph Waldo Emerson, The Problem, in AMERICAN POETRY: THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 
(John Hollander ed., 1993) (“He builded better than he knew.”). 
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B. The Internal-Limits Canon 
For present purposes, it does not matter whether “enumeration” should be 
understood literally or as a term of art. Either way, the enumeration principle 
differentiates the basis for congressional authority from that of the general leg-
islative power that states enjoy.60 Whether or not express enumeration is the 
only way in which the Constitution delegates power to Congress, Congress can 
only do those things that it is affirmatively authorized to do. And on that theo-
ry, Supreme Court Justices standardly reject constructions of congressional 
power that seem tantamount to affording Congress plenary legislative authori-
ty. To permit constructions that broad would eliminate the role of internal lim-
its as a meaningful part of the system. Thus, Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote in 
United States v. Lopez that reading the commerce power to authorize Congress 
to regulate the mere possession of firearms would leave the Court “hard 
pressed to posit any activity by an individual that Congress is without power to 
regulate.”61 The same trope featured centrally in the argument over Section 
5000A of the Affordable Care Act, commonly called the individual mandate. 
According to the joint dissenting opinion in NFIB, upholding the mandate 
would “extend federal power to virtually all human activity.”62 And that cannot 
 
60. I do not mean to say that neither view of the enumeration/delegation issue is more hospita-
ble to the internal-limits canon. A system’s commitment to confining its legislature to a set 
of enumerated powers (in the literal sense) could demonstrate a stronger commitment to 
the idea of constraining that legislature with internal limits than might be present in a sys-
tem more willing to let its legislature exercise some unenumerated powers along with its 
enumerated ones, in part because the internal limits on a legislature might be thought easier 
to identify if all of the legislature’s powers were written in express terms. Conversely, ac-
cepting the view that Congress has often exercised unenumerated powers might weaken the 
intuition that the Constitution insists unyieldingly on a system of internal limits. It remains 
the case, however, that the existence of unenumerated powers need say nothing about 
whether the full set of powers is subject to internal limits. And indeed, the Supreme Court 
decisions recognizing unenumerated powers have not denied the internal-limits canon. 
61. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 564 (1995). 
62. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius (NFIB), 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2643 (2012) (Scalia, Kennedy, 
Thomas & Alito, JJ., dissenting). An aside: note the use of the word “activity.” The core of 
the argument that the commerce power could not authorize the individual mandate was that 
the commerce power could regulate activity but not inactivity, and supporters of this perspec-
tive pointed out that prior Commerce Clause decisions had used the word “activity” when 
describing the reach of that Clause. See, e.g., id. at 2587 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.). Against 
that argument, one could say that the prior decisions had not intended to use “activity” in a 
limiting sense. Instead, phrases like “legislation regulating that activity will be sustained,” 
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560, or “appellee’s activity . . . may . . . be reached by Congress,” Wickard 
v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 125 (1942), were intended as the equivalent of “legislation regulating 
that subject matter may be sustained” and “this matter may be reached by Congress.” In the 
sentence quoted above from the NFIB joint dissent, the phrase “all human activity” can only 
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be right, because “the proposition that the Federal Government cannot do eve-
rything is a fundamental precept.”63 
These opinions articulate the internal-limits canon by insisting that Con-
gress’s powers cannot be construed in a way that would let Congress regulate 
without limit. A more careful specification of the idea requires an important 
clarification, because neither sustaining the Gun-Free School Zones Act nor 
upholding the individual mandate would suggest that there are no limits on 
federal power. Even if Congress can require people to buy insurance, it cannot 
prohibit Buddhism64 or commandeer state legislatures65 or operate segregated 
schools in the District of Columbia.66 The Justices are presumably always 
aware of such external limits, even if they sometimes write as if an absence of 
meaningful internal limits is the same as the absence of any limits at all.67 To 
avoid exaggeration, therefore, the internal-limits canon should be rendered this 
way: Congress’s powers cannot be construed in a way that would permit Con-
gress to regulate anything at all unless blocked by an external limit.68 
Note too that proponents of the internal-limits canon insist not merely that 
individual powers of Congress have internal limits but that the powers of Con-
gress taken as a whole have such limits. Obviously individual powers have in-
ternal limits. The power to govern the District of Columbia cannot be used to 
govern Delaware, and the power to punish pirates cannot be used to fix the day 
on which the Electoral College votes. The issue is whether all the powers col-
lectively face internal limits—that is, whether some potential legislation must 
lie beyond any of Congress’s powers, even without considering external limits. 
After all, if most of Congress’s powers had internal limits but at least one (say, 
 
be read to mean “all human behavior whether described as activity or inactivity,” because 
the point of the sentence is that the individual mandate extends congressional regulation to 
something properly described as inactivity. If ever there were a case in which Justices should 
have been attentive to distinctions between activity and inactivity, it was NFIB. If even the 
joint dissenters in NFIB used the word “activity” to name a category that includes inactivity, 
there is little reason to think that prior Justices used the word in a more precise and limiting 
way. 
63. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2647 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas & Alito, JJ., dissenting). 
64. See U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
65. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992). 
66. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954). 
67. See, e.g., Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 564 (1995) (declaring that the government’s theory in support 
of section 922(q) would make it “difficult to perceive any limitation on federal power”). 
68. This complete formulation makes reference to external limits but not process limits because 
external limits are the ones that make it possible to say, “Congress could not enact legisla-
tion XYZ.” Process limits are in principle compatible with the enactment of any substantive 
legislation. 
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the commerce power) had none, then internal limits would not in practice con-
strain Congress’s ability to legislate: Congress could simply use the commerce 
power to do anything that it would be prevented from doing by the internal 
limits of other powers. Similarly, even if every individual power of Congress 
(including the commerce power) had internal limits, internal limits would not 
constrain the total reach of Congress if everything beyond the limits of any giv-
en power were within the scope of some other power. Consider, as a simplify-
ing analogy, a legislature with seven enumerated powers, each of which au-
thorized legislation on a different day of the week. Each power would have a 
clear internal limit. The Monday power would not authorize legislation on 
Tuesday, and so on. But these internal limits would do nothing to constrain 
the legislature’s reach, because no matter what the legislature wished to do 
(and no matter when), it would have a power adequate for the task. According-
ly, the internal-limits canon is a proposition about the scope of all of Con-
gress’s powers taken as a whole, not a proposition about the limits on those 
powers taken separately. It directs that some imaginable laws must lie beyond 
Congress’s power, even before considering the constraints imposed by external 
limits. 
C. The Internal-Limits Canon as Non Sequitur 
The enumeration principle is related to the internal-limits canon, and it is 
easy to conflate the two ideas. Carefully considered, however, the two are not 
the same. And it is a mistake to think that the first requires the second. 
The enumeration principle provides a criterion for determining what pow-
ers Congress is entitled to exercise. Not to belabor the point, and subject to the 
wrinkle about whether “enumerate” means “delegate” or “articulate expressly,” 
the principle provides that Congress may exercise only those powers that the 
Constitution enumerates. I take that principle to be a valid rule of constitution-
al interpretation. But without more, the enumeration principle does not ad-
dress the scope of any particular congressional power, nor does it address the 
scope of all those powers combined. As Chief Justice Marshall put the point, 
“This government is acknowledged by all, to be one of enumerated powers. . . . 
But the question respecting the extent of the powers actually granted, is per-
petually arising . . . .”69 
The internal-limits canon is different. It states a rule about the extent of 
congressional powers. That rule, as already explained, is that the powers of 
 
69. M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 405 (1819). 
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Congress may not be construed in a way that would permit Congress to pass 
any and all laws that it could pass if it had a general police power. 
The standard wisdom in constitutional law holds that the enumeration 
principle implies the internal-limits canon. The powers of Congress are enu-
merated, the reasoning goes, and although that principle does not precisely de-
fine the scope of each power, it does mean that there is an overall limit on their 
scope, because there would be no point in enumerating particular powers if in 
practice the power of Congress is general.70 That inference might seem plausi-
ble, but it is in fact a non sequitur, and it is at that inference that my argument 
is aimed. 
Congress has only those powers affirmatively given to it by the Constitu-
tion. But those particular powers might in practice enable Congress to do all 
the things that Congress could do if the Constitution gave Congress a police 
power, much as my authorizing my son to eat chocolate, vanilla, or strawberry 
ice cream would, under certain circumstances, give him a mandate as broad as 
the one he would have if I just authorized him to eat ice cream.71 So yes, the 
federal government is a government of enumerated powers. It just may not fol-
low that the set of things Congress can do is thereby narrowed. The burden of 
the rest of this Article is to explain why this view is consistent with constitu-
tional structure, history, and text.  
 
70. Chief Justice Marshall’s dictum that the enumeration presupposes something unenumerated 
is commonly taken to state this inference—though, as noted earlier, this standard use of the 
Gibbons dictum is a bit of a misreading. See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text. 
71. As suggested in the Introduction, the two authorizations in practice authorize the same 
range of conduct if it turns out that the only flavors of ice cream available at the relevant 
time and place are the ones in the specific authorization. And note that it might be perfectly 
rational for me to issue the more particular authorization even if, in the circumstances ob-
taining at a given time, it turned out to have the same impact as the general one. Maybe my 
concern is to prevent my son from eating the mint chocolate chip ice cream that I was saving 
for myself. Toward that end, I do not authorize him to eat the mint chocolate chip. Unbe-
knownst to me, though, my wife has already eaten the mint chocolate chip. (Either she did 
not know I was saving it or she decided, perhaps correctly, that her claim was greater than 
mine.) So when my son opens the freezer, he is as free to choose as if I had given a blanket 
authorization. The convergence between the general authorization and the particular one 
comes about not because I intended it to but because I lacked perfect information about the 
circumstances under which my son would act. And note, too, that nothing about the interest 
I intended to protect by giving a more limited authorization is compromised by the fact that 
my particularized authorization turns out not to be limiting. 
  
the limits of enumeration 
595 
 
i i .  structure 
The dominant structural rationale for the internal-limits canon sounds in 
federalism.72 According to the standard account, internal limits on congres-
sional power are essential in order to preserve the role of state and local gov-
ernment. There is little question about the worthiness of this goal, and the lit-
erature on federalism canvasses many reasons why. Local decision making is 
often better informed about local problems than federal decision making.73 De-
pending on one’s conception of democracy, local decision making may also be 
more democratic.74 Decision making in smaller polities means more opportuni-
ty for individual citizens to experience civic engagement, leadership, and politi-
cal responsibility.75 Differentiated decision making in different states (and dif-
ferent localities) creates regulatory diversity, and regulatory diversity can 
 
72. This is not because the enumeration of congressional powers sounds in federalism to the 
exclusion of other structural frameworks. The enumeration of congressional powers obvi-
ously has implications for the distribution of powers among the federal branches. Nonethe-
less, the internal-limits canon and the idea of a limiting enumeration are more part of the 
rubric of federalism than that of the separation of powers. There are several ways to under-
stand why that is so. For one, the differentiation of function among the federal branches 
makes it easy (if sometimes too simple) to understand the limits on Congress vis-à-vis the 
other branches in terms of the difference between legislation and other kinds of government 
action, rather than between legislation on certain topics and legislation on other topics. As a 
result, the idea of a Congress with general legislative power might seem less threatening to a 
branch whose job is not legislative at all than to a government also charged with legislating 
but whose room to legislate is constrained by the legislation that comes from Congress. In-
deed, so strong is the tendency to think of the enumeration in terms of federalism rather 
than in terms of the separation of powers that the paradigmatic ways of expressing the 
enumeration principle often speak of the federal government as a whole, rather than Con-
gress in particular, as the entity with enumerated powers. See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. 
Bus. v. Sebelius (NFIB), 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2577 (2012) (“The Federal Government ‘is acknowl-
edged by all to be one of enumerated powers.’” (quoting M’Culloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 
405)); United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. 126, 159 (2010) (Thomas, J., dissenting)  
(“In our system, the Federal Government’s powers are enumerated . . . .”); Carter  
v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 291 (1936) (“[T]he powers which the general  
government may exercise are only those specifically enumerated in the Constitution  
. . . .”); United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 65 (1936) (“[T]he United States is a government 
of limited and enumerated powers . . . .”); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (9 Wheat.), 161 
(1824) (“[T]he constitution of the United States is one of delegated and enumerated powers 
. . . .”). 
73. See Daniel Halberstam, Federalism: A Critical Guide 15-16 (Mich. Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal 
Theory Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. 251, 2011), http://ssrn.com/abstract 
=1924939 [http://perma.cc/PPG5-HY9N]. 
74. See Barry Friedman, Valuing Federalism, 82 MINN. L. REV. 317, 389-90 (1997).  
75. See Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Is Federalism Good for Localism? The Localist Case for Federal Re-
gimes, 21 J.L. & POL. 187 (2005). 
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satisfy the preferences of more citizens than uniform regulation can, assuming 
that the subject matter is not one that requires wide coordination and assuming 
also at least some correlation between the aggregate preferences of different 
state populations and the regulatory schemes those states adopt.76 Regulatory 
diversity may also provide the laboratories-of-democracy benefit, as the ability 
to see different legal rules operate increases the store of knowledge available to 
future policymakers.77 For all these reasons, federalism—or more particularly, 
the local decision making that is one side of federalism—is valuable.78 
A. The Limits of Internal Limits 
But are internal limits on the powers of Congress a necessary mechanism—
or even a particularly helpful mechanism—for securing these benefits of feder-
alism in the context of the American constitutional regime? The conventional 
answer is yes, and on an apparently straightforward rationale: internal limits 
mean less federal law,79 and less federal law means more space for state auton-
 
76. The classic account is Charles Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 
416 (1956). For a nice illustration, see Michael W. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the 
Founders’ Design, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1484, 1494 (1987) (reviewing RAOUL BERGER, FEDERAL-
ISM: THE FOUNDERS’ DESIGN (1987)). 
77. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
78. Edward Rubin and Malcolm Feeley have famously argued that the benefits discussed here 
are more properly thought of as the virtues of decentralization than of federalism. In their 
view, real federalism sounds not in consequences for policymaking but in a deontological 
right to be different. See Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a 
National Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. REV. 903 (1994). Much of what Rubin and Feeley say about 
federalism is valuable, but it is not clear on what basis they justify the choice to limit the 
term “federalism” to the particular usage they prefer. For what it is worth, my own sense is 
that “federalism” is a reasonable label for a system in which local decision makers are select-
ed by local constituents rather than by the central government and have the authority to 
raise and spend revenue independently of that central government. In any event, nothing 
important for the present analysis turns on the choice between these two labels. Internal 
limits are conventionally promoted in the name of something that constitutional discourse 
standardly calls “federalism,” and I am showing why arguments based on that thing do not 
supply a good reason for insisting on internal limits. If it were true that the thing here called 
“federalism” should be called “decentralization,” nothing about my argument would need to 
change other than the term. 
79. A consequentialist analysis of internal limits would need to weigh the costs of disallowing 
federal laws that might have some social benefit in their own right. Perhaps an ideal form of 
internal limits would eliminate this concern: in keeping with a theory usually known as 
“subsidiarity,” some theorists have proposed that the limit on Congress’s enumerated pow-
ers should be the principle that the federal government may legislate only in cases where 
there is a reason for regulation to be undertaken centrally rather than left to more local au-
thorities. See, e.g., Regan, supra note 8, at 555. But as at least some leading proponents of this 
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omy. It is a powerful idea, at least on the surface, in part because it seems like 
simple common sense. But the dynamics of modern federalism are more com-
plicated than the conventional answer assumes. For one thing, the allocation of 
decision making among federal and state authorities is not always a zero-sum 
game. Sometimes federal regulation displaces local regulation, but sometimes 
federal law empowers state policymakers more than it constrains them.80 At 
least as importantly, internal limits might have little practical capacity to reduce 
the amount of federal law. This is so both because Congress can usually work 
around internal limits and because the conditions of modern regulation often 
mean that the elimination of one federal law leaves a subject matter regulated 
by some other federal law, rather than making the subject matter free from fed-
eral regulation entirely. 
Some of these dynamics can be illustrated by reference to the most promi-
nent internal limits articulated in recent case law: the economic-noneconomic 
limit on the commerce power that the Court imposed in Lopez and the action-
inaction limit that five Justices endorsed in NFIB. Each of these limits makes it 
possible to describe laws that Congress’s commerce power would not author-
ize, and the Justices keenest on enforcing internal limits in Lopez and NFIB de-
scribed these limits as required by the internal-limits canon. But neither limit 
cultivates the substantive virtues of vesting decision-making power in states 
rather than in the federal government all that well, because neither limit creates 
a significant policymaking space in which states can operate free from federal 
interference. Indeed, these limits did not even prevent the implementation of 
the substance of the federal regulations to which they were applied. After Lopez 
held that the Gun-Free School Zones Act could not be sustained as a law regu-
lating an economic activity with substantial effects on interstate commerce,81 
Congress reenacted the substance of the Act as a regulation of instrumentali-
ties—here, firearms—that move in interstate commerce,82 and the courts have 
uniformly upheld the reenacted version.83 In NFIB, a majority of the Justices 
took the position that the individual mandate is not a valid exercise of the 
 
view acknowledge, it may not be simple or even possible to translate this principle into rules 
that courts are institutionally well suited to enforce. See id. at 559; see also Kramer, supra note 
21, at 1499-1501 (noting that which policies are best made centrally and which locally change 
as conditions change, and doubting that courts have the capacity to keep up). 
80. See infra Part II.B. This phenomenon is a variety of the more general phenomenon by which 
law sometimes empowers rather than limits the subjects to whom it applies. See, e.g., HART, 
supra note 44, at 27-28. 
81. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995). 
82. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) (2012). 
83. See, e.g., United States v. Dorsey, 418 F.3d 1038, 1046 (9th Cir. 2005); United States v. 
Danks, 221 F.3d 1037, 1039 (8th Cir. 1999). 
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commerce power,84 but a different majority upheld the mandate as a valid exer-
cise of the taxing power.85 Indeed, even the Justices who concluded that the 
mandate was not a valid exercise of the taxing power agreed that Congress 
could enact the substance of the mandate using its taxing power; their conten-
tion was only that Congress had not actually done it that way.86 If the internal 
limits announced in Lopez and NFIB cannot even prevent the implementation 
of the substantive regulations at issue in those two cases, it seems unlikely that 
they can clear away or forestall any great amount of federal law.87 
 
84. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius (NFIB), 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2591 (2012); id. at 2647 
(Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas & Alito, JJ., dissenting). 
85. See id. at 2600 (majority opinion); id. at 2609 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring 
in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part). 
86. See id. at 2651, 2655 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas & Alito, JJ., dissenting). 
87. NFIB did meaningfully limit the power of Congress on a different front—conditional 
spending—by holding that Congress could not require states to choose between participat-
ing in a substantial expansion of Medicaid and withdrawing from Medicaid entirely. See id. 
at 2604-07 (holding that Congress may not use the threat of withdrawing funding from a 
large existing program as a means of getting states to agree to participate in a different, albe-
it related, program); see also Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Anti-Leveraging Principle and the 
Spending Clause After NFIB, 101 GEO. L.J. 861 (2013) (formulating this holding). This hold-
ing can be understood either as the imposition of an evadable internal limit on the model of 
Lopez or as sounding in external limits rather than internal ones. If the rule that Congress 
may not “leverage” existing spending to coerce states to undertake new programs is an in-
ternal limit on the spending power, it is one that Congress could in principle work around 
by using the spending power differently, just as Congress worked around Lopez by using the 
commerce power differently. For example, Congress could repeal Medicaid entirely and 
then enact a formally new program (“Shmedicaid”) whose content would fully reproduce 
that of Medicaid and also include the ACA’s proposed expansion. Or Congress could enact 
the new portion of Medicaid as an entirely federal program, without state participation. 
Neither of these alternatives seems particularly realistic today, but the reasons lie in the po-
litical process rather than in internal limits on the spending power. Alternatively, the 
Court’s rationale on this subject could be understood as sounding in external limits. Accord-
ing to Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion for three Justices, and also according to the four joint 
dissenters (not dissenting on this point), the conditional spending provisions of the ACA’s 
Medicaid expansion were tantamount to Congress’s compelling the states to participate in 
that expansion, and Congress may not compel states to enact or administer particular regu-
latory programs. See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2603-05. That prohibition is the same one animat-
ing the anticommandeering rule of New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992), and Printz 
v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997), and the rationales given in NFIB echoed and cited 
those cases. See, e.g., NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2602-03. In short, NFIB’s striking down this aspect 
of the Medicaid expansion might be best understood, in substance, as an application of the 
anticommandeering principle in the context of federal spending, with the necessary varia-
tion that in NFIB the states had a formal choice about whether to participate, and the Court 
found that formalism to be devoid of substance and accordingly insufficient to defeat the 
general principle. Understood this way, the Medicaid holding in NFIB rests on an external 
limit, because the principle that Congress may not compel the states to regulate is not par-
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The unreliability of internal limits as tools for increasing the available space 
for autonomous state decision making results partly from the mismatch be-
tween a formal set of limitations on Congress and the internal-limits canon’s 
goal of creating substantive areas of policymaking into which Congress cannot 
intrude. As is typical of formal rules, these internal limits can be evaded by re-
course to other formal rules, and, in this area, the evasions enable Congress to 
reach its intended regulatory targets by formally different routes. The problem 
runs deep: as Justice Ginsburg suggested in NFIB, even if the action-inaction 
distinction could prevent Congress from passing a law compelling Americans 
to eat broccoli, Congress could create the same substantive regime by prohibit-
ing the purchase or consumption of any food other than broccoli, except by 
persons who had already eaten their broccoli.88 
This is not to say that internal limits are completely incapable of preventing 
federal regulation. Sometimes workarounds are costly. A given Congress might 
be willing to enact the individual mandate but not to create a single-payer sys-
tem. In such a case, an internal limit blocking the individual mandate might 
result in a meaningful regulatory difference. Congress would still be authorized 
to enact sweeping healthcare reform, but it might choose not to, assuming that 
it could not identify some other workaround less costly than the single-payer 
approach. Moreover, if an enacting Congress does not foresee that its statute 
might be invalidated on the basis of an internal limit, the choice of whether to 
enact a workaround will probably lie with a different Congress that might not 
be as invested in the substance of the legislation. Congress did not reinstate the 
civil remedy of the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) after the Court 
struck it down in United States v. Morrison,89 even though the move that 
 
ticular to the Spending Clause. It rests on a principle of federalism that transcends any spe-
cific enumerated power and blocks otherwise valid uses of any of the powers listed in Article 
I. 
88. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2625 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in 
part, and dissenting in part). Either such law might face challenges under the Due Process 
Clause, but those challenges would traffic in external rather than internal limits. 
89. 529 U.S. 598 (2000). Morrison’s holding on the scope of Section Five of the Fourteenth 
Amendment is of little moment here. By holding that Congress may not use Section Five to 
reach a private actor, id. at 621-27, the Court did impose an internal limit on one of Con-
gress’s enumerated powers. But as noted earlier, it is no part of the present argument to de-
ny that the enumerated powers have internal limits when taken individually. Of course they 
do. The power to declare war cannot be used to coin money, and the power to coin money 
cannot be used to define and punish piracies. My argument here is that the various internal 
limits on congressional powers may not actually limit what Congress can do, because in sit-
uations where an internal limit prevents a given power of Congress from authorizing some 
desired statute, Congress may have a different power that can get the job done. Morrison’s 
treatment of Section Five is consistent with that possibility. Unlike in cases like Board of 
Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001), and Kimel v. Florida Board 
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worked after Lopez was available there as well, at least in substantial part. Im-
agine a federal statute creating a civil remedy for crimes of gender-motivated 
violence committed with an instrumentality of interstate commerce. The fact 
that Congress did not pass such a statute may reflect mostly the differing policy 
preferences of Congress and the President in 1994, when VAWA was passed, 
and in 2001, after Morrison was decided.  
If the aftermath of every invalidation of a federal statute on internal-limits 
grounds followed Lopez’s script rather than Morrison’s, there would be less 
need to recognize the flaws in the internal-limits canon. Congressional worka-
rounds reinstating the substance of the initial law would consume time and ef-
fort, but the end-state regulatory environment would be unaffected. But rein-
statements by workaround are not automatic, as the Morrison example 
illustrates. Yes, Congress can legislate more or less as it thinks best, subject to 
external limits, but only if its policy preferences remain constant from the time 
of a statute’s initial passage to the time of the workaround, and only if Con-
gress is willing to legislate twice. 
Viewed sympathetically, this dynamic might transform internal limits into 
a species of process limit, one that permits Congress to pursue its chosen pro-
gram so long as it makes the heightened effort required to do so. If properly 
tailored to protect the interests of federalism, internal limits might have some 
value as process limits, albeit by becoming something rather different from 
what constitutional lawyers have traditionally taken internal limits to be. But 
given the frequency with which Congress could design workarounds in cases 
where it knew ex ante how internal-limit rules would apply, the heightened 
process requirements might come mostly as a matter of ex post surprise. Had 
the 1994 Congress known that Lopez was coming, it might have enacted VA-
WA with some appropriate workaround. Similarly, although Congress in 2009 
and 2010 preferred mandates to a single-payer health insurance system, Con-
gress would likely have been pushed toward some solution that did not risk in-
validation on action-inaction grounds—whether single-payer or something 
else—if the action-inaction distinction had been a clear part of commerce doc-
trine prior to the passage of the ACA. As a result, any limiting effects of inter-
nal limits might have a somewhat arbitrary shape, tracking accidents of timing 
 
of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000), the Section Five issue in Morrison was about Congress’s abil-
ity to regulate private actors, not its ability to overcome the sovereign immunity of state offi-
cials. On the understanding that with respect to private actors Congress could use a Lopez-
like workaround to impose the civil remedy at issue in Morrison under the commerce power, 
that case’s view of Section Five does not limit Congress’s overall regulatory jurisdiction. 
Note, too, that the limit on Congress’s ability to bind state officials that Section Five cases 
like Garrett and Kimel represent is an external limit on Congress, not an internal one. Its 
source is the Eleventh Amendment. 
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more than any consistent logic about what policies should be made locally ra-
ther than centrally. Perhaps such limits could create a hodgepodge of disal-
lowed federal statutes, or applications of federal statutes,90 and perhaps the 
regulatory space opened thereby would add a bit to the sum total of regulatory 
space available for state policymaking. But it seems doubtful that that addi-
tional space would be large or well targeted enough to add meaningfully to the 
robust, extensive practice of state and local decision making that exists today 
under a regime in which internal limits play almost no role. 
These explanations of why internal limits might not fulfill the promise of 
enhancing federalism are partly a function of currently prevailing conditions 
and attitudes about federal legislation. In other words, the fact that internal 
limits are today poor tools for ensuring substantive areas of state policymaking 
might not mean that such rules could never be useful for that purpose. Once 
upon a time, a set of internal limits seemed to protect substantial state policy-
making space. Consider the famous distinction between direct and indirect ef-
fects in commerce doctrine.91 As every law student learns, that distinction even-
tually came to seem absurd, and the boundary it policed disintegrated.92 But at 
an earlier time, that distinction and others like it seemed to work pretty well as 
frameworks for circumscribing the reach of federal power. Why could such 
formalisms succeed at some times and not at others? Three reasons—or per-
haps three faces of the same reason—supply much of the answer.  
First, as Lawrence Lessig has observed, these doctrines worked when they 
did, not simply because earlier judges were more sympathetic to metaphysical 
distinctions like the one between direct and indirect effects (though that may to 
some extent have been the case) but also because those judges as a group had a 
widely shared sense of how to distinguish between federal and state spheres of 
regulation.93 When judges implemented doctrines like the direct-indirect dis-
tinction in light of that shared sense, they reached a more or less stable set of 
results. Second, the sense of federalism that Lessig identifies as widely shared 
among judges of a certain era was also shared by many legislators, such that 
Congress was simply less inclined to regulate pervasively than it was later on. 
 
90. By requiring Congress to reenact the Gun-Free School Zones Act as a regulation of firearms 
that have moved in interstate commerce, Lopez prevented the application of the regulations 
at issue in cases where the firearms in question have not moved in interstate commerce. Giv-
en the interstate market in guns, that would be a small subset of all the cases that the origi-
nal statute would have covered. But it is more than nothing. 
91. See, e.g., A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 546 (1935). 
92. Cf. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 41 (1937) (rejecting the direct-indirect 
distinction as a basis for limiting the commerce power). 
93. Lawrence Lessig, Translating Federalism: United States v. Lopez, 1995 SUP. CT. REV. 125, 161. 
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Congressional restraint meant that autonomous spheres of state regulation 
were a normal part of the landscape and that any judicially imposed limits on 
Congress reinforced that reality. (In a sparsely regulated world, the invalida-
tion of a single law might leave the relevant subject matter unregulated. In to-
day’s densely regulated world, the invalidation of a single law is more likely to 
mean that some other law becomes the operative regulation.) Third, Con-
gress’s disinclination to regulate pervasively meant that the judiciary could po-
lice the federal-state balance without constant conflict with the elected branch-
es. Persistent conflict sometimes sharpens the questions at issue, and in the 
absence of constant conflict judges were perhaps more able to get by with a 
shared-sense jurisprudence than they would have been in the face of pressure 
to articulate clear rules about what was and was not permissible. 
These conditions did not last forever. Eventually, and partly due to the log-
ic of living in an increasingly interconnected world, more and more members 
of the decision-making class came to question prevailing intuitions about the 
exceptional nature of federal governance. The Sixteenth Amendment signaled 
an appetite for a larger federal regulatory agenda and supplied the means for 
carrying one out.94 Congress became more willing to legislate and to legislate 
pervasively. In the judiciary, the erosion of an intuitive consensus about the 
limits of federal power meant that doctrinal distinctions like the one between 
direct and indirect effects could no longer maintain the old limits. Absent 
shared substantive understandings, the doctrinal formulas came to seem amor-
phous, arbitrary, or both. And the separate-spheres vision famously known as 
“dual federalism”95 gave way to other conceptions (marble-cake federalism,96 
picket-fence federalism97) built on the recognition that modern federalism in-
volves two sets of officials working on common subject matter, rather than two 
sets of officials operating in different policy domains. 
Even in the era of dual federalism, though, internal limits never did the 
work of delineating separate spheres all by themselves. Instead, internal limits 
were supplemented as needed by a judicial willingness to declare forthrightly 
 
94. See Douglas Laycock, Notes on the Role of Judicial Review, the Expansion of Federal Power, and 
the Structure of Constitutional Rights, 99 YALE L.J. 1711, 1736-37 (1990) (reviewing ROBERT F. 
NAGEL, CONSTITUTIONAL CULTURES: THE MENTALITY AND CONSEQUENCES OF JUDICIAL RE-
VIEW (1989)) (describing the role of the Sixteenth Amendment in this process). 
95. Corwin, supra note 34, at 4 (offering the seminal description of “dual federalism”). 
96. See MORTON GRODZINS, THE AMERICAN SYSTEM: A NEW VIEW OF GOVERNMENT IN THE 
UNITED STATES 8 (Daniel J. Elazar ed., 1966). 
97. See TERRY SANFORD, STORM OVER THE STATES 80 (1967) (imagining federal and state gov-
ernments as the horizontal posts of a picket fence and federal, state, and local programs as 
the vertical posts connecting them). 
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that certain spheres of substantive regulation were reserved to the states. For 
example, when the Supreme Court in United States v. Butler struck down a fed-
eral subsidy provided under the Agricultural Adjustment Act, the majority 
opinion discussed the question presented as a matter of the extent of Con-
gress’s spending power, but then at a critical moment declared that the disposi-
tive consideration was not to be found in the best construction of the Spending 
Clause. Instead, the subsidy program was unconstitutional because it invaded a 
reserved right of the states, namely the right to control agricultural produc-
tion.98 Similarly, the Court in Hammer v. Dagenhart struck down the Child La-
bor Act’s rules prohibiting certain interstate shipments of goods produced with 
child labor not because prohibiting interstate shipments was not within the 
commerce power—the Court conceded that the transportation of property was 
as much commerce as purchase and sale—but because this restriction on inter-
state shipping would impinge on the inherently local matter of manufactur-
ing.99 In these cases, the Court discussed the scope of Congress’s spending and 
commerce powers, but the considerations that invalidated the laws at issue 
were not conceptual accounts of “spending” and “commerce.” They were ac-
counts of what regulatory subject matters must be reserved to the states. If the 
question is what sort of judicial doctrine would help protect local decision 
making, that reserved-sphere approach makes a good deal of sense: a robust 
doctrine of reserved subject matters can limit congressional authority in ways 
that preserve meaningful and independent policymaking spaces for state gov-
ernments. But that solution cannot vindicate the idea that there must be inter-
nal limits on Congress’s enumerated powers, because it is a solution based on 
external limits rather than internal ones. Just like the Free Exercise Clause, a 
rule that Congress may not regulate agriculture or manufacturing cross-cuts 
the enumerated powers, blocking congressional action on the basis of a consti-
tutional concept arising somewhere outside the delegation of powers to Con-
gress.  
To be sure, one could try to present reserved-sphere rules as internal limits 
by reading them into the interpretation of particular congressional powers. 
One could say, for example, that the commerce power does not authorize Con-
gress to regulate agriculture because “commerce” and “agriculture” are two dif-
ferent things. But unless one also ensured that Congress’s other powers could 
 
98.   See United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 68 (1936) (describing the regulation of agriculture as 
lying within “the reserved rights of the states”). 
99.   See Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 272 (1918) (reserving regulation of “the production 
of articles,” as opposed to their interstate transportation, to states, and holding such produc-
tion immune from the effect of a regulation that formally regulated interstate transporta-
tion). 
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not be used to regulate “agriculture,” this limitation on the commerce power 
would not prevent Congress from regulating in that area with some other tool. 
And if one purported to read the same internal limit into every one of the enu-
merated powers—if one maintained, in other words, that the proper interpreta-
tion of every power granted to Congress anywhere in the Constitution hap-
pened to exclude any power to make regulations affecting agriculture—then 
observers might wonder whether the real operating force was an external limit 
prohibiting Congress from regulating agriculture, rather than a remarkable 
confluence of many different internal limits.  
In principle, either answer is possible. Maybe the work is really being done 
by an external limit, or maybe there are simply spheres of social life that lie be-
yond the internal limits of all of Congress’s powers. The latter possibility is, of 
course, the one that the internal-limits canon insists upon. But in deciding 
which possibility is more likely, it is worth noticing that at least some of the 
Court’s key decisions purporting to enforce internal limits referred to external-
limit considerations at analytically critical junctures and that the reasoning of 
those cases is more easily comprehensible if we take external limits to be doing 
work. If the Court cannot explain why a spending program is unconstitutional 
without invoking the states’ reserved control over agriculture, and if the Court 
cannot explain why a law formally regulating the interstate shipment of com-
mercial goods is unconstitutional without invoking the inherent right of states 
to control manufacturing, then internal limits are not the sole motive force of 
those decisions. Even before the New Deal, external limits did much of the 
work.100 
B. Federalism Without Internal Limits 
Nothing in this analysis suggests the demise of federalism. State govern-
ments today exercise considerable sway over a broad swath of important poli-
cymaking domains. Differentiated state decision making is more than robust 
enough to deliver substantial regulatory diversity, not to mention immensely 
greater opportunities for civic engagement and political leadership than would 
be possible if American political decision making were fully centralized. So the 
inability of internal limits to protect enough autonomous state policymaking to 
make federalism worthwhile has not nullified those virtues of federalism. State 
decision making is simply perpetuated by other mechanisms. 
 
100.   I thank the students in Professor Gil Seinfeld’s 2014 seminar on the Law of American Feder-
alism for pushing me to clarify this point. 
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A few of these mechanisms are external limits on Congress’s powers. Per-
haps most fundamentally, Congress may not unilaterally terminate101 or recon-
figure102 existing states. Congress may not dictate the location of a state capi-
tal103 or tax a state’s own tax revenue.104 State sovereign immunity doctrines are 
external limits, albeit defeasible through the exercise of congressional powers 
rooted in constitutional provisions postdating the Eleventh Amendment.105 
The anticommandeering rules are external limits that help states engage in pol-
icymaking by limiting the federal government’s ability to force the hands of 
state decision makers.106 
Obviously, these limits are useful only if there are substantive areas in 
which states can make policy, and other mechanisms help to ensure that such 
areas exist. Some of these mechanisms are process limits, albeit not quite the 
set of process limits that the Founders imagined. Many of those limits never 
worked the way the Founders imagined they would,107 and others have been 
repudiated by constitutional amendment108 or undermined by changing prac-
tices and attitudes over time.109 Nonetheless, process limits remain important 
aspects of American governance, in ways that include both formal and informal 
interactions between federal decision makers and their state counterparts. For a 
variety of reasons that prior scholarship has canvassed, state and local officials 
have substantial influence in the shaping of federal law and federal regulations, 
and they regularly deploy that influence to prevent federal authority from un-
duly contravening local interests or sidelining state decision makers.110 One 
 
101. Texas v. White, 74 U.S. 700, 725 (1868) (describing an “indestructible Union, composed of 
indestructible states”). 
102. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3. 
103. Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559 (1911). 
104. New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572, 582 (1946). 
105. See, e.g., Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976) (holding that state sovereign immunity is 
limited by the enforcement provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
106. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992). 
107. Accord Kramer, supra note 21, at 1490-91. 
108. For example, the Seventeenth Amendment converted the Senate from an assembly of agents 
of state governments into an assembly of popular representatives (though it may be more 
accurate to say that it mostly ratified a conversion that had already taken place in practice, 
because for most of the nineteenth century state legislatures tended to elect to the Senate 
people who had campaigned successfully for the office among the general public). See Wil-
liam H. Riker, The Senate and American Federalism, 49 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 452, 463-64 (1955). 
109. Again, the changing status of the Senate is a good example, for reasons given supra note 108.  
110. See, e.g., Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 YALE L.J. 
1256 (2009); Kramer, supra note 21, at 1543-46. One can carve the terrain of process limits, 
political safeguards, and administrative safeguards in various ways. For example, Kramer 
 
  
the yale law journal 124:576   20 14  
606 
 
should not romanticize or overstate these mechanisms.111 The idea that politi-
cal-process mechanisms will always do right by the interests of federalism 
would be a just-so story, as would the idea that the political process always 
does right by any other kind of interest. But one need not subscribe to the idea 
that process federalism cures all ills to recognize that it has some important ef-
fects. 
A second set of mechanisms—perhaps overlapping with the first112—falls 
within the rubric known as “cooperative federalism.”113 It is a normal feature of 
modern American governance that Congress works with states, rather than 
around them, when engaging in important regulatory projects. Federal statuto-
ry schemes addressing social security,114 the environment,115 health care,116 edu-
cation,117 transportation,118 crime control,119 and many other topics rely on the 
states as powerful players in deciding what will actually happen and who will 
 
describes the administrative dynamics at issue here as a form of political safeguard, but 
Bulman-Pozen and Gerken prefer to think of “administrative safeguards of federalism” as 
falling within a different category. See Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra, at 1285 n.103, 1292 
(analyzing and critiquing Kramer’s approach). But the question of how best to organize 
these phenomena into a taxonomy is not really important (and I do not read any of the 
writers just mentioned to think otherwise). 
111. See, e.g., Catherine M. Sharkey, Inside Agency Preemption, 110 MICH. L. REV. 521, 582 (2012) 
(pointing out that federal agencies are sometimes criticized for failing to consult state offi-
cials even when officially required to do so). 
112. Cooperative federalism might be a species of process federalism, or it might be a separate 
phenomenon, or the two phenomena might overlap, depending on how one draws the 
boundaries of each concept. For present purposes, it is not important to decide which set of 
constructions is best. What matters is that the mechanisms that go by these names collec-
tively do a great deal to ensure ongoing meaningful decision-making roles for state and local 
officials. 
113. “Cooperative federalism” is better understood as an umbrella term naming several varying 
arrangements rather than a single precise model of federal-state cooperation. See Abbe R. 
Gluck, Intrastatutory Federalism and Statutory Interpretation: State Implementation of Federal 
Law in Health Reform and Beyond, 121 YALE L.J. 534, 584-88 (2011) (describing several ar-
rangements that could plausibly be described as versions of cooperative federalism). 
114. See, e.g., Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 301-06 (2012). 
115. See, e.g., Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7543(b), (d), (e)(2) (2012). 
116. See, e.g., Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 18002(e)(3), 18003(a)(1) 
(2012). 
117. See, e.g., No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, 20 U.S.C. §§ 6304, 6311 (2012). 
118. See, e.g., 23 U.S.C. § 148 (2012). 
119. See, e.g., Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, 42 U.S.C. § 14163 (2012). 
  
the limits of enumeration 
607 
 
get what.120 The Affordable Care Act provides a prominent contemporary ex-
ample. Congress made the American Health Benefit Exchanges state-based in-
stitutions, which means that state officials can decide how to implement the 
certification criteria that will determine what plans are finally offered to the 
public in their states.121 Some members of Congress believed that the policy of 
the ACA would be best carried out by a national health insurance exchange, but 
others took it as a matter of critical importance that the exchange be put in 
state hands, and the latter view prevailed.122 The ACA also dramatically ex-
panded Medicaid, and state bureaucracies are the ones with the expertise, local 
knowledge, and boots on the ground that are needed to make the envisioned 
expansion real. To be sure, many states have to date declined to participate in 
these ventures,123 and that development has thrown a fair amount of decision 
making back to the federal government. For present purposes, though, what 
matters is precisely how unusual (and indeed unanticipated) it is for states to 
opt out on this scale. The ACA is a limiting case, involving the greatest policy 
conflict in decades. Normal federal governance involves a high degree of state 
involvement as a matter of routine, as noted above with respect to policy areas 
from crime control to highway management to the environment and social se-
curity. 
The normal pattern is neither an accident nor a matter of congressional 
grace. It is a structural aspect of modern American government, one that has 
emerged in light of considerations about the capabilities of states and the limi-
tations—practical, rather than legal—of Congress.124 More than twenty percent 
of all “federal” nondefense spending for 2011 was spent by state and local gov-
ernments administering cooperative federalism programs.125 Implementation of 
 
120. See generally Abbe R. Gluck, Federalism from Federal Statutes: Health Reform, Medicaid, and the 
Old-fashioned Federalists’ Gamble, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 1749 (2013) (surveying the pervasive 
role of state decision making and state implementation within federal statutory schemes). 
121. See Gillian E. Metzger, Federalism Under Obama, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 567, 575-79 (2011). 
122. See Gluck, supra note 113, at 578. 
123. See Status of State Action on the Medicaid Expansion Decision, HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY  
FOUND. (Aug. 28, 2014), http://kff.org/health-reform/state-indicator/state-activity-around 
-expanding-medicaid-under-the-affordable-care-act [http://perma.cc/8TQY-DBWW] (list-
ing the states that had opted to participate as of August 28, 2014, and those which had not). 
124. See Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Political Economy of Cooperative Federalism: Why State Auton-
omy Makes Sense and “Dual Sovereignty” Doesn’t, 96 MICH. L. REV. 813, 868-70 (1998) (de-
scribing the practical limits on federal capacity that prevent federalization of policy areas at 
will). 
125. See Historical Budget Data—May 2013, CONG. BUDGET OFFICE (May 14, 2013), http:// 
www.cbo.gov/publication/44197 [http://perma.cc/CDZ7-TH5Y] (demonstrating a total of 
$2.899 trillion in total nondefense spending in 2011, calculated by adding mandatory outlays 
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the ACA is driving the figure higher. Even if Congress wanted to, the federal 
government could not tomorrow (or next year, or in five years) displace the 
states from their roles in governance under this system, in part because it could 
not simply summon into existence the personnel and institutional capacity that 
would be necessary for doing so. To return again to the ACA example, the 
threat that state opt-out has posed to the successful implementation of the Act 
is predicated on the reality that Congress needs the states to make things hap-
pen.  
Given that reality, state governments have considerable latitude to make 
decisions about the public policies that federal statutory schemes represent. 
Cooperative federalism is cooperative (or uncooperative)126 rather than dicta-
torial: the states are not neutral conveyor belts for the implementation of fed-
eral programs. State and local officials negotiate, bargain, modify, and some-
times undermine federal policy, and their opportunity to do all of those things 
yields the range of benefits that makes federalism valuable in the first place: lo-
cal knowledge brought to bear on local questions, local responsibility for those 
decisions, regulatory diversity, broadened opportunities for civic engagement 
and political leadership, and so on.127 State officials’ choices within these 
schemes are constrained by boundaries set at the national level, but that is true 
of any system of state autonomy that respects the principle of federal suprema-
cy—or even just constitutional supremacy. 
The pertinent question is whether the policymaking discretion that state 
and local officials exercise is consequential enough to make those officials 
meaningful decision makers rather than ministerial instruction-takers, and of 
that there can be little doubt. Recall that many state officials wanted responsi-
bility for the healthcare exchanges, because they understood the enormous 
power that responsibility confers. As many have noticed, states that want to 
impede the federal policy embodied in the Affordable Care Act have had ample 
opportunity to do so. Note, too, by way of general analogy, that local decision 
makers are often consequential even though most localities formally have no 
 
and net interest from Table 3, to discretionary nondefense outlays from Table 4); Federal 
Grants to State and Local Governments, CONG. BUDGET OFFICE 1, 3, 7 (Mar. 2013), http://www 
.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/43967_FederalGrants.pdf [http://perma.cc 
/X2XK-GDG3] (showing a total of $607 billion in federal grants to state and local govern-
ments in fiscal year 2011). 
126. See generally Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 110 (describing instances in which states 
used regulatory power provided to them by the federal government to oppose federal poli-
cy). 
127. See id. at 1284-94 (outlining the advantages of uncooperative federalism). Uncooperative 
federalism also sometimes wastes resources and blunts the effectiveness of salutary public 
policy initiatives. Id. at 1287. 
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existence or power whatsoever except that which the state chooses to grant.128 
If even the fully hierarchical relationship of states and cities does not preclude 
local governments from delivering many of the benefits of federalism—local 
knowledge, local accountability, preference matching, opportunities for civic 
engagement and political leadership—then it should be clear that state (and lo-
cal) governments can deliver many of these benefits even when working in en-
vironments structured by federal legislation. States are, after all, much more 
independent of the federal government, even in an era of active federal regula-
tion, than localities are of states. 
Despite the thick reality and enormous importance of cooperative federal-
ism, constitutional lawyers sometimes suspect that whatever “federalism” is in-
volved in these schemes is not real federalism in the constitutional sense.129 Re-
al federalism, the intuition runs, does not reside in complex regulatory systems 
that are, at bottom, creations of Congress. On this view, the federalism that the 
Constitution ordains requires a more thorough separation between that which 
is national and that which is local130—a separation more consistent with the 
values of early Americans who distrusted central authority.131 And that separa-
tion, the Supreme Court has explained, stands or falls with the internal-limits 
canon.132 As Abbe Gluck has put the point, though, the idea that that kind of 
separation can deliver the benefits of federalism “depends on what no longer 
exists,” namely “significant areas of regulation that are reserved to the states 
and into which federal lawmaking may not tread.”133 In a world where dual 
federalism is gone and federal regulation is pervasive, disallowing this or that 
law as beyond Congress’s powers will never recreate the kind of separation that 
 
128. See Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part I—The Structure of Local Government Law, 90 COL-
UM. L. REV. 1, 111-12 (1990).  
129. Cf. City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1873 (2013) (describing the question of the va-
lidity of a federal agency’s construction of a statute specifying state obligations within such a 
system as one of “faux-federalism”). 
130. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617-18 (2000) (“The Constitution requires 
a distinction between what is truly national and what is truly local.”); Garcia v. San Antonio 
Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 580-81 (1985) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“The central 
issue of federalism, of course, is . . . whether any area remains in which a State may act free 
of federal interference.”). 
131. See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. (NFIB) v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2578 (2012) (citing 
THE FEDERALIST NO. 45 (James Madison)). 
132. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567-68 (1995) (stating that upholding the Gun-
Free School Zones Act “would require us to conclude that the Constitution’s enumeration of 
powers does not presuppose something not enumerated, and that there never will be a dis-
tinction between what is truly national and what is truly local” (citation omitted)). 
133. Gluck, supra note 120, at 1751. 
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once made it sensible to think of state policymaking as thoroughly independent 
of Congress, rather than as constantly interacting with federal governance. 
The older vision of separate-sphere federalism has a strong hold on Ameri-
can imaginations. Its simplicity and historical resonance make it appealing, es-
pecially when contrasted with the bureaucratic technicality that cooperative 
federalism embodies.134 Fundamental constitutional intuitions are usually con-
ceptions that well-socialized Americans appreciate without specialized profes-
sional training. We learn them as part of our civic education long before we ar-
rive at law school. So it is a great disadvantage of cooperative federalism that 
even the most creative Schoolhouse Rock writer would find it a challenging con-
cept to convey. Depicting the mechanisms of cooperative federalism can re-
quire multi-page interlocking organizational charts, and the romantic national-
identity aspects of federalism tend not to resonate in discussions about, say, the 
criteria for federal funding of state-initiated roadside lighting projects.135 But if 
the question is how American governance actually works—a question that 
should concern practical people, and a question that courts should keep in 
mind when exercising their considerable disruptive power—then cooperative 
federalism is a central part of the answer. It is what the bulk of federalism looks 
like in the modern Republic, and it provides many of the benefits that make 
federalism valuable. 
No one should think that cooperative federalism provides those benefits in 
exactly the optimal ways or in exactly the optimal quantities. Neither coopera-
tive federalism nor process federalism nor any other kind of federalism—
including a federalism based on internal limits—could be expected to produce 
that outcome. But process federalism and cooperative federalism yield the ben-
efits that make federalism valuable more robustly than any system of internal 
limits has in a long time, if indeed a system of internal limits ever yielded those 
benefits without the support of an underlying theory of separate spheres that 
courts were willing to enforce through external limits on federal power. 
 
134. In AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utilities Board, 525 U.S. 366 (1999), the Court confronted a question 
about the scope of a federal agency’s authority to prescribe the obligations of state agencies 
under a provision of the Telecommunications Act of 1996. Two Justices saw this issue as 
raising questions of federalism. See id. at 402-12 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part); id. at 412-31 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). But given 
that the issue was both highly technical and one arising within what is ultimately a statutory 
scheme set and variable by Congress, the Court was probably not wrong to remark that “it is 
hard to spark a passionate ‘States’ rights’ debate” on the matter. Id. at 379 n.6 (majority 
opinion). What the remark reveals, of course, is an intuition that constitutional federalism 
should be the sort of thing that riles people up, not the sort of thing that resides in techno-
cratic detail. 
135. See 23 U.S.C. § 148(c) (2012) (establishing eligibility criteria for federal funding for roadside 
lighting projects); id. § 148(h) (describing reporting requirements). 
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C. Attitudinal Formation and the Internal-Limits Canon 
There remains at least one more concern about the damage that discarding 
the internal-limits canon might do to federalism. Part of what maintains the 
federalist dynamics of interaction between state and federal officials is a set of 
ideas about what each government is supposed to do. Process federalism and 
cooperative federalism are maintained partly by practical conditions and partly 
by a set of attitudes, and the two are mutually reinforcing. In other words, 
these mechanisms persist in part because the players who deliberate and 
negotiate and decide are inclined to consider local decision making valuable. To 
be sure, people’s ideas about which government should do what are far from 
uniform, and there is constant renegotiation of certain boundaries, as there is 
in most complex relationships. The system could not possibly rely on 
everyone’s sharing precisely, or even close to precisely, the same set of views 
about the proper roles of state and federal government. Still, a certain amount 
of shared sense among officials and the public to which they respond is an 
important element of the system, and a wholesale shift in attitudes might cause 
existing dynamics to unravel. Not quickly: the limits on federal power are 
rooted in practical considerations as well as attitudinal ones, so it would take a 
fair amount of institutional reconfiguration to overcome those limits even if 
federal officials wanted to do so. Indeed, the difficulty of the project is probably 
one important force in deterring any such ambition. But in principle, and over 
time, a broad and deep shift in attitudes could facilitate large changes in 
constitutional dynamics. 
Might official stories like the one embodied in the internal-limits canon 
play a role in preventing such an evolution? We form our constitutional expec-
tations in part by hearing how the system is described.136 An articulated princi-
ple under which the powers of Congress are inherently limiting might teach 
Americans—including both officeholders and at least some of the civically lit-
erate citizens to whom they respond—to think twice about whether a given 
project is appropriate for the exercise of central power. If the internal-limits 
canon were repudiated, one of the influences supporting that consciousness 
would disappear. And that, one might worry, could lead to the disintegration 
of what is now a relatively healthy federal system. 
One can only speculate as to the gravity of this concern. I expect that differ-
ent people will have different intuitions, just as people through the centuries 
have had different intuitions about whether preserving social order and inter-
 
136. See generally Richard Primus, Constitutional Expectations, 109 MICH. L. REV. 91 (2010) (de-
scribing the formation and power of citizens’ expectations about how the constitutional sys-
tem is supposed to function). 
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personal decency requires public affirmation of orthodox religious beliefs, 
whether metaphysically sound or otherwise. The internal-limits canon is sali-
ent within official ideas about federalism, but that does not tell us how much 
weight it bears in the attitudinal architecture. Maybe it is important. But may-
be it is marginal, or even superfluous. Many other influences also contribute to 
the attitudes necessary for maintaining a limited federal government, some 
conceptual and some practical. To take just one set of examples, consider the 
many canons of federal statutory interpretation that embody and reinforce the 
idea that federal governance should not impinge too much on state governance. 
Absent clear statements to the contrary, federal statutes are not to be read to 
intrude on traditional state criminal jurisdiction, or to abrogate state sovereign 
immunity, or to preempt state law, or, speaking more generally, to alter an ex-
isting balance between federal and state power.137 Would the loss of the inter-
nal-limits canon provoke the loss of these other canons as well, or would these 
other canons and a host of other forces go on teaching the basic lesson even 
without being supplemented by the particular practice of speaking (emptily) 
about internal limits? And if we were to try to figure out how removing this 
particular piece of the discourse might shift attitudes, we should not exclude 
the possibility that the internal-limits canon might undermine as well as en-
hance the idea that the federal government has a limited regulatory role. Eve-
ryone who knows the internal-limits canon also knows that in practice the fed-
eral government has long seemed to enjoy the equivalent of general legislative 
power, or very nearly so. Might the takeaway message for at least some audi-
ences be that core tenets of federalism are quaint fables that practical people 
should not take seriously? Or more broadly, that constitutional law is an enter-
prise in which we say one thing and do another? If so, might these attitudes be 
at least as damaging as letting go of the internal-limits canon would be? 
There is no way to measure the net discursive effect of the internal-limits 
canon on the self-limiting tendencies of federal officials. But in the absence of 
knowledge, there are reasons for skepticism about how much attitudinal dam-
age would result if the canon were abandoned. Maybe the formula’s very famil-
iarity leads us to overestimate not just its cogency but also its importance as an 
attitudinal prompt. Given that uncertainty, it seems prudent to avoid making 
this concern into too strong a reason for holding on to the canon, especially at a 
time when taking the canon seriously might cause important distortions in 
constitutional decision making.  
*** 
 
137. See, e.g., Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2088-90 (2014). 
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The practical value of the internal-limits canon is supposed to be its capaci-
ty to limit central governance in a way that fosters the benefits of federalism. 
But we should not be confident that it is actually a useful means to that end. 
Internal limits might not be able to do very much either to limit the federal 
government or to enhance meaningful state decision making. It is therefore 
fortunate that the constitutional system contains other kinds of limits. Indeed, 
the system contains many of those limits precisely because the Founders collec-
tively foresaw that internal limits might not get the job done. They insisted on 
alternatives. 
i i i .  history 
Constitutional history is much broader than the history of the Founding 
period, and normative constitutional practice often appears different when 
viewed through the lens of one period in history rather than another. One way 
to understand the argument against the internal-limits canon is as an argument 
that takes the most recent century of constitutional law as a source of authori-
tative practices.138 That said, it is a fact about American constitutional thought 
that the Founding period occupies a privileged position among historical eras. 
And it is in the Founding that the historical argument in favor of the internal-
limits canon is firmly grounded. According to that argument, internal limits 
were a critical part of the Founding design, and fidelity to that design requires 
the continued operation of internal limits as meaningful constraints on Con-
gress. 
There is no serious doubt that most of the Founders expected internal lim-
its on congressional powers to constrain the federal government.139 But con-
ventional wisdom about internal limits in the Founding design makes at least 
two important errors. The first, addressed in Part III.A, concerns the im-
portance of internal limits relative to other kinds of limits in constraining the 
federal government. Following an argument famously advanced by Hamilton 
and others at the time of ratification, many leading figures have noted that the 
original Constitution contained an enumeration of congressional powers but 
no Bill of Rights and reasoned that the Founding generation saw the enumera-
 
138. This is not to say that the most recent century, if taken as authoritative, would support any 
position on this issue univocally. Centuries rarely do that sort of thing. 
139. The qualification is necessary because at least a few leading figures doubted that the enu-
meration of congressional powers would have that effect. See infra Part III.A. 
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tion as the most important mechanism for limiting federal power.140 This line 
of thinking is a mistake. The Hamiltonian argument was not the well-
considered theory of the Founding generation. It was a talking point that most 
of that generation dismissed as implausible.  
Second, the conventional approach implicitly treats the enumeration of 
congressional powers as a matter of independent principle, rather than as a 
strategic choice intended to preserve local decision making and individual 
rights. The better reading is that the Founders saw enumeration as a means to 
those ends, not as somehow valuable in itself. And as I explain below, fidelity 
to choices about means sometimes differs from fidelity to choices about ends. If 
the idea of a government limited by its enumerated powers had been a matter 
of independent value to the Founders—that is, if the Founders would have in-
sisted on internal limits as a mechanism for constraining federal power even 
with the knowledge that other kinds of limits would be equally effective, or 
more so, at preserving local decision making and protecting individual rights—
then the internal-limits canon might be part of what fidelity to their design re-
quired. But on the understanding that the choice to enumerate Congress’s 
powers is better seen as a means to those ends, modern decision makers can be 
faithful to the Founding design even if Congress is not in practice meaningfully 
constrained by internal limits—provided, of course, that Congress exercises on-
ly the powers delegated to it, and provided also that local decision making and 
individual rights are protected by other means within the constitutional design. 
This second point is the focus of Part III.B. 
A. How Important Were Internal Limits to the Founders? 
Within American constitutional culture, a canonical story teaches that the 
Founders considered internal limits more important than external ones. Ac-
cording to that story, the delegates at the Constitutional Convention believed 
that the enumeration of congressional powers would limit the federal govern-
ment. Indeed, the story continues, the Founders were so confident in the 
mechanism of enumeration that they considered a Bill of Rights unnecessary, 
or even counterproductive, because specifying affirmative prohibitions might 
mislead people into thinking that Congress was not confined to its enumerated 
powers.141 More than one important figure at the Founding articulated this idea 
about the enumeration and a Bill of Rights: Madison and James Wilson, for 
 
140. See, e.g., Michael J. Klarman, The Founding Revisited, 125 HARV. L. REV. 544, 560 (2011) (re-
viewing PAULINE MAIER, RATIFICATION: THE PEOPLE DEBATE THE CONSTITUTION, 1787-1788 
(2010)). 
141. See id.  
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example, both prominently advanced the claim.142 But for modern audiences 
the idea is most closely associated with Hamilton, whose exposition of the ar-
gument in Federalist 84 is perhaps its most canonical expression.143 
Given the enormously important status that modern Americans afford to 
the Bill of Rights, the normal role of this story is to make the enumeration and 
its internal limits seem essential. After all, the reasoning runs, the drafters of 
the Constitution considered the system of internal limits even more important 
than express guarantees of free speech, free religious exercise, and so forth. In 
NFIB, both Chief Justice Roberts and the joint dissent invoked this canonical 
story as a way of making the point, on the authority of the Founders, that in-
ternal limits must play a central role in the constitutional design.144 But the ca-
nonical status of this story notwithstanding, it is a mistake to think that fidelity 
to the Founding design requires operative internal limits. To begin to see why, 
it may help to think critically about the canonical story. Two points are particu-
larly worth noting.  
First, the Convention’s omission of a Bill of Rights does not demonstrate 
that the delegates regarded enumeration as the chief mechanism for constrain-
ing Congress.145 To most of the delegates, the most important mechanisms for 
constraining Congress were neither external limits nor internal limits but pro-
cess limits. The arrangements to which the Convention paid attention at length 
and in detail concerned the composition of and relationships among decision-
making institutions: popularly elected House and state-appointed Senate, sin-
 
142. See, e.g., James Madison, Speech at the Virginia Ratifying Convention (June 24, 1788), in 5 
THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 231-32 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1904); James Wilson, Speech 
at the Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention (Oct. 6, 1787), PA. PACKET & DAILY ADVERTISER, 
Oct. 10, 1787, at 2 cols. 3-4. 
143. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 84 (Alexander Hamilton) (arguing against the idea that the Consti-
tution should include a Bill of Rights). 
144. See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius (NFIB), 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2577-78 (2012) (“In-
deed, the Constitution did not initially include a Bill of Rights at least partly because the 
Framers felt the enumeration of powers sufficed to restrain the Government.”); id. at 2676-
77 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas & Alito, JJ., dissenting) (“[T]he Framers considered structural 
protections of freedom the most important ones, for which reason they alone were embod-
ied in the original Constitution and not left to later amendment.”). On its face, this passage 
from the dissent speaks of structure in general—a category that includes process limits as 
well as internal ones. But in context, the reference is clearly to internal limits, because the 
dissent is explaining its insistence on enforcing an internal limit (on the commerce power) 
rather than trusting a process limit (namely democratic elections). 
145. For one provocative alternative suggestion as to why the Convention’s draft did not include 
a Bill of Rights, see William Ewald, The Committee of Detail, 28 CONST. COMMENT. 197, 239-
40 (2012) (discussing Edmund Randolph’s desire to avoid a debate about fundamental is-
sues of political morality that might prompt heated conflict among the delegates over the is-
sue of slavery). 
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gle-member executive chosen with a state-based mechanism, and so forth.146 
The prevailing wisdom held that elections and state governments would keep 
federal power in check, and if that didn’t work, then the states would use their 
resources—political, financial, persuasive, even perhaps military—to rally pub-
lic resistance against central authority.147 Some of these expectations turned out 
to be chimerical.148 Others were vindicated, albeit to varying degrees and une-
venly over time.149 But regardless of how one judges the successes and failures 
of the attempt to check federal power by process mechanisms, it remains the 
case that the Convention invested most heavily in this strategy. By comparison, 
the attention paid to enumeration and internal limits was slight. Prior to the 
appointment of the Committee of Detail, there was no deep engagement with 
questions about whether this or that power should be included among the 
powers of Congress, and the draft enumeration that the Committee presented 
on August 6 was largely accepted by the full Convention, albeit with emenda-
tions.150 To be sure, none of this demonstrates that the Convention regarded 
 
146. According to Madison’s journal, discussion of such structural issues dominated the Conven-
tion from the presentation of the Virginia Plan on May 29 up until July 26, when the Con-
vention adjourned for ten days to permit the Committee of Detail to do its work, and then 
again from August 6 until the Convention rose on September 17, with few exceptions be-
yond those indicated. JAMES MADISON, THE DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 
WHICH FRAMED THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 23-577 (Gaillard 
Hunt & James Brown Scott eds., 1920); see infra note 150. 
147. See Kramer, supra note 21, at 1492, 1515-20 (attributing this set of views to the drafters and 
ratifiers of the Constitution); see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 46 (James Madison) (articulating 
this perspective). 
148. Unless one counts the events of 1861, the states did not in practice act as organizing frame-
works for the most robust forms of resistance to the extent that some prominent Founders 
imagined they would. For one account of the reasons why state-based process limits failed 
to materialize in the relevant ways, see Kramer, supra note 21, at 1492. 
149. The structure of the federal government always limits its activity, both because elections 
limit what decision makers will do and because of the checks and balances that make formal 
lawmaking difficult. So to take one leading and enormously consequential example, the 
Founders expected that a bicameral Congress would impose more obstacles to federal law-
making than a unicameral Congress would. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madi-
son). They seem to have been right. We of course have no unicameral Congress to act as an 
experimental control, but much modern experience indicates that the division of Congress 
into two houses does act as a brake on federal legislation. 
150. Perhaps the most important changes that the Convention made to the Committee’s list of 
enumerated powers were the elimination of a power to appoint a Treasurer, the addition of 
the bankruptcy and patent powers, the specification of the power to govern the national cap-
ital city, and two or three adjustments to the powers related to the state militias and the na-
tional army. Compare U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, with 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CON-
VENTION OF 1787, at 181-83 (Max Farrand ed., 1911) (describing the record of August 6, 1787, 
and reporting Article VII of the Report of the Committee of Detail). 
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the enumeration as unimportant. Given the incomplete nature of the historical 
evidence, the delegates may have paid more attention to the enumeration than 
the surviving records reflect. But the available record strongly suggests that the 
delegates’ greatest focus was on other mechanisms—principally process mech-
anisms—for limiting federal legislation. 
Second, no matter what the Convention delegates may have thought, the 
broader public decisively rejected the idea that the enumeration would limit 
Congress well enough to make a Bill of Rights unnecessary. Yes, people like 
Hamilton, Madison, and Wilson defended their work with that argument.151 
But they utterly failed to persuade the public. Some contemporaries dismissed 
the claim that enumeration would suffice as just a rationalizing afterthought—
an idea grasped at to parry Bill of Rights objections to the Constitution, rather 
than an authentic and central piece of the Convention’s plan.152 Jefferson told 
Madison directly that he considered the idea a ruse, one that might bamboozle 
a credulous audience but which on its merits should not be taken seriously.153 
After all, it was not obscure even in 1788 that the powers to tax, to regulate 
commerce, to raise armies, and so forth could be deployed oppressively unless 
affirmatively limited.154 So the cry for a Bill of Rights continued unabated.155 
The inadequacy of the draft Constitution’s limits on federal power was a com-
 
151. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 84 (Alexander Hamilton); James Madison, Speech at the Vir-
ginia Ratifying Convention (June 24, 1788), in 5 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON, supra 
note 142, at 231-32; James Wilson, Speech at the Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention (Oct. 6, 
1787), in 2 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 167-68 
(Merrill Jensen ed., 1976). 
152. See Mark A. Graber, Enumeration and Other Constitutional Strategies for Protecting Rights: The 
View from 1787/1791, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 357, 377-78 (2007). Note in particular that Hamil-
ton’s warning (that the specification of external limits would dangerously imply that Con-
gress could do anything not prohibited) may have been hard to take seriously given that the 
proposed Constitution already did specify external limits. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9 
(specifying prohibitions on Congress). 
153. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Dec. 20, 1787), in 1 THE REPUBLIC OF LET-
TERS: THE CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN THOMAS JEFFERSON AND JAMES MADISON 1776-1826, 
at 511-15 (James Morton Smith ed., 1995) (“To say, as Mr. Wilson does, that a bill of rights 
was not necessary, because all is reserved in the case of the general government which is not 
given . . . might do for the audience to which it was addressed; but it is surely a gratis dic-
tum, the reverse of which might just as well be said[.]”). 
154. See, e.g., George Mason, Speech at the Virginia Ratifying Convention (June 14, 1788), in 3 
THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS, ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL 
CONSTITUTION 415-16 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1836) [hereinafter ELLIOT’S DEBATES]. 
155. See, e.g., PAULINE MAIER, RATIFICATION: THE PEOPLE DEBATE THE CONSTITUTION, 1787-1788, 
at 56 (2010) (describing the continuing push for a Bill of Rights). 
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mon and insistently pressed criticism during the ratification debates,156 and the 
creation of vigorous external limits was one of the first orders of business once 
the new system was up and running. Acting pragmatically, many delegates to 
the state ratifying conventions chose to ratify the Constitution and fix the 
problem immediately afterwards rather than insisting that the whole arduous 
process be repeated from its beginning. But any idea that the Founding genera-
tion trusted Hamilton’s famous argument about internal limits is belied by the 
first great fact about constitutional reform in the new Republic: the quick pas-
sage and ratification of the first ten Amendments. In short, the most important 
feature of the Founding generation’s relationship to the idea that the enumera-
tion would be sufficient for limiting Congress is this one: they didn’t buy it. 
One could take the view that the Constitution’s defenders during the ratifi-
cation debates were correct when they said that internal limits would do the 
work, regardless of how they came to that view and even though they were un-
able to persuade their contemporaries. The idea might then be worth taking 
seriously despite its rejection in its own time. But if so, the reason for thinking 
this conception worthy of our respect is not the legal authority of the Found-
ing.157 It is the first-order merits of the idea. And to conclude that the idea was 
a good one, we would have to believe that the system of internal limits actually 
would have sufficed for protecting individual rights and maintaining the sub-
stantive virtues of federalism more generally. Experience does not offer much 
support for that view. As already described, internal limits do very little to con-
strain the scope of congressional regulation. One might hypothesize that the 
ineffectiveness of internal limits is due to the existence of too many external 
ones: if the public had acquiesced in the Convention’s design, the idea would 
run, then a combination of process limits and internal limits would have been 
forced to do the work, and they would have been adequate for the task. Or one 
could argue that the inconsequentiality of internal limits is the result of regret-
table decision making by officials—judicial and otherwise—who have failed to 
apply Article I properly, rather than an inherent feature of the constitutional 
design. But each of these possibilities is speculation at best. On the first score, 
we cannot know how American constitutionalism would have developed in the 
 
156. See, e.g., id. (describing the continuing push for a Bill of Rights); see also THE FEDERALIST 
NO. 84 (Alexander Hamilton) (acknowledging the central place of this objection among the 
various objections to ratification).  
157. Unless the authority of the Founding sounds in something other than respect for the out-
come of a democratic process. See Michael C. Dorf, Integrating Normative and Descriptive 
Constitutional Theory: The Case of Original Meaning, 85 GEO. L.J. 1765, 1770 (1997) (suggest-
ing that much originalism actually looks to the Founders on the theory that they were our 
heroic ancestors, rather than on a theory of political legitimacy based on democratic process-
es). 
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absence of as significant an occurrence as the adoption of the Bill of Rights. On 
the second, much of the wisdom in sound constitutional design is the correct 
anticipation of how officials will behave. At some point, the fact that officials 
do not implement Article I in genuinely constraining ways indicates that Article 
I is not a usefully constraining mechanism within this system of government. 
Given how little Article I’s internal limits restrain Congress, the Founding 
generation seems wise to have rejected the claim that enumerating Congress’s 
powers would be sufficient to limit the federal government. Yes, things could 
be different if things had been different. But it is also possible that resting on a 
system of internal limits would always have been risky, and that at some point 
those limits would have fallen short, just as the Founders feared. So there is a 
substantial irony in play when constitutional lawyers invoke the idea that the 
Founders gave pride of place to internal limits. Such invocations are probably 
meant to celebrate the wisdom of the Founders—a wisdom, the idea either im-
plicitly or explicitly runs, that may be lost on those who look to external limits 
to do the important work.158 The greater wisdom of the Founding generation, 
though, lay in its refusal to rest on a system of internal limits. It does not show 
respect for the Founders to associate them with a flawed idea that they were 
prescient enough to discard as overly optimistic. We would show them more 
respect by associating them with the better ideas that they in fact endorsed. 
B. Enumeration as a Means 
The Founders rejected the idea that the enumeration would do all the 
work, but they did approve a system in which internal limits played a role. The 
crucial concern about enumerated powers and fidelity to the Founding, there-
fore, is not whether the enumeration should be sufficient for limiting Congress 
even in the absence of external limits and process limits. It is whether internal 
limits must operate as an essential feature of the system—whether it is neces-
sary, in order to honor the choices of the Founders, for the internal limits of 
 
158. See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius (NFIB), 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2676-77 (2012) (Scal-
ia, Kennedy, Thomas & Alito, JJ., dissenting) (“Structural protections—notably, the re-
straints imposed by federalism and separation of powers—are less romantic and have less 
obvious a connection to personal freedom than the provisions of the Bill of Rights or the 
Civil War Amendments. Hence they tend to be undervalued or even forgotten by our citi-
zens. It should be the responsibility of the Court to teach otherwise, to remind our people 
that the Framers considered structural protections of freedom the most important ones, for 
which reason they alone were embodied in the original Constitution and not left to later 
amendment.”). The structural principle whose apparent disregard this passage was written 
to protest was, of course, that the enumeration of congressional powers is inherently limit-
ing. 
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Congress’s powers, taken as a whole, to meaningfully limit the scope of federal 
legislation. 
Because the concern of this Article is with the internal-limits canon rather 
than with the scope of particular congressional powers, the relevant question 
here requires looking to something more general than the original meanings of 
the Commerce Clause, the Taxing Clause, the Necessary and Proper Clause, 
and so forth. As already explained, I am not arguing for any particular reading 
of those or any other congressional powers. I am arguing against the idea that 
all of those powers must be interpreted to conform with a principle that exists 
at the level of general design—that is, that there are things that Congress can-
not regulate even apart from the Constitution’s affirmative prohibitions. And 
also as already explained, my argument is not that Congress does have the 
practical equivalent of a police power under the conditions of 2014. It is that 
Congress might turn out to have power that broad, depending on the best in-
terpretations of its various powers and the mapping of those powers, so inter-
preted, onto the present social world. So if it were the case that current consti-
tutional law should track the original meanings of relevant constitutional 
clauses (whether on an original-public-meaning view or otherwise) and if it 
were further the case that the powers of Congress would add up to less than a 
police power if given their individual meanings, summed together, and applied 
today, then it would be the case that Congress is now meaningfully constrained 
by internal limits on its powers. But it would be the case only as a matter of 
contingency. To show that it must be the case as a matter of design requires a 
different kind of analysis—one that goes to Founding-era ideas about the func-
tion of the enumeration as a whole, rather than to the meanings of particular 
grants of power within it. 
At the level of design, it is still the dominant conventional view that respect 
for the decisions of the Founders requires the internal-limits canon. The bases 
for that view are not obscure. So long as we remain conscious of the difficulties 
involved in attributing a complex view to a large and vaguely defined group 
like “the Founders,” and subject to the caveat that the Founders knew better 
than to trust the project of limiting Congress to internal limits alone, it is rea-
sonable to say that the Founders intended the enumeration to play a role in 
limiting the jurisdiction of Congress. 
It does not follow, though, that fidelity to the Founders’ design requires 
modern decision makers to identify consequential internal limits on Congress’s 
powers, because the relevant question is not whether the Founders expected 
internal limits to do that work. It is whether that expectation creates obliga-
tions today. This question is not simply a recapitulation of a more general 
question about the authority of original meanings, though there are points of 
contact between the present concern and that larger debate. Even if original 
meanings can bind later generations, the Founders’ ideas about limiting con-
  
the limits of enumeration 
621 
 
gressional power could be vindicated in the ways that matter even if internal 
limits turned out to impose no constraints on modern federal legislation. 
To see why, it is important to recognize that the Founders’ decision to 
enumerate congressional powers is better understood as a matter of strategy 
than as a matter of principle. Those two categories are not always mutually ex-
clusive, and it is possible to construe both “strategy” and “principle” in ways 
that would place the internal-limits approach under either heading. My state-
ment that enumeration is better understood as a strategy simply means that the 
Founders understood enumeration as a means to an end, or a set of ends, ra-
ther than as a matter of independent value. The point of enumerating Con-
gress’s powers was to help secure an adequately empowered but properly lim-
ited central government.159 The idea was that Congress should have the ability 
to do what the nation needs done, but it should neither deny individual rights 
nor imperil local decision making. Enumeration was a means to those ends. 
Madison spoke of the matter that way.160 So did Hamilton.161 So did James 
 
159. Both halves—empowerment and limitation—were important. Madison, for example, ex-
pressed at the Convention that, in defining the powers of Congress, his major worry was to 
give Congress enough power, rather than to prevent it from having too much. See, e.g., 1 THE 
RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 150, at 356-58 (describing the 
record for June 21, 1787). 
160. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 46, at 294-95 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) 
(explaining that giving Congress only a particular set of powers would help preserve state 
power against federal interference by ensuring that the people would remain more attached 
to their state governments than to the federal government, because the only thing that could 
cause the people to switch loyalty would be better administration on the federal side; ac-
cordingly, “the State governments could have little to apprehend, because it is only within a 
certain sphere that the federal power can, in the nature of things, be advantageously admin-
istered”); see also James Madison, Speech at the Virginia Ratifying Convention (June 24, 
1788), in 5 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 142, at 231-32 (explaining that 
enumerating the powers of Congress would be a safer way to protect essential individual 
rights than listing rights in the manner of external limits); Letter from James Madison to 
Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 17, 1788), in 5 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 142, at 
269, 271-72 (same). Note, too, that Madison’s doubts about the system of enumeration 
tracked his sense of the effectiveness of that system as a means to the desired ends. See James 
Madison’s Notes from the Constitutional Convention (May 31, 1787), in 1 THE RECORDS OF 
THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 150, at 53 (“Mr. Madison said that he had 
brought with him into the Convention a strong bias in favor of an enumeration and defini-
tion of the powers necessary to be exercised by the national Legislature; but had also 
brought doubts concerning its practicability. His wishes remained unaltered; but his doubts 
had become stronger. What his opinion might ultimately be he could not yet tell. But he 
should shrink from nothing which should be found essential to such a form of Govt. as 
would provide for the safety, liberty and happiness of the Community. This being the end 
of all our deliberations, all the necessary means for attaining it must, however reluctantly, be 
submitted to.”). 
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Wilson,162 Edmund Randolph,163 John Rutledge,164 and Oliver Ellsworth,165 
who collectively constituted four-fifths of the committee that actually drafted 
 
161. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 84, at 510-20 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) 
(arguing that enumerating Congress’s powers was the best way to secure individual rights 
against federal interference). To be comprehensive, one should note that Hamilton’s classic 
remonstrance against adding a Bill of Rights to the Constitution spoke in two voices. In a 
means-ends vein, Hamilton praised the enumeration as the best way to secure individual 
rights because the other leading candidate for that job—the specification of external limits—
would dangerously imply that the federal government could exercise whatever powers did 
not contravene those limits, thus affording a pretext for people who wished to argue for un-
duly large constructions of governmental power. Id. at 513-14. In a considerably less instru-
mental vein, he also argued that the affirmative specification of rights against government 
power was fundamentally contrary to the premises of the Constitution. Such affirmative 
specifications were the stuff of concessions wrung from sovereign princes, as was the case 
with Magna Carta or the English Bill of Rights. As a matter of principle, Hamilton wrote, a 
declaration of rights would be completely out of place in a constitution founded on the idea 
that all power flows from the people. See id. at 512-13. The fact that Hamilton made both ar-
guments suggests that he expected his audience to contain people who would respond fa-
vorably to each: he was, after all, writing a document intended to persuade people to vote in 
favor of the Constitution. But if we credit Hamilton with a bit of self-awareness in the writ-
ing of Federalist No. 84, it would be hard to take seriously the idea that he believed the mat-
ter-of-principle argument, because Federalist No. 84 lauds the Convention’s draft Constitu-
tion for all of the affirmative specifications of rights that it did contain—to habeas corpus, to 
jury trial, against bills of attainder, against convictions for treason without the testimony of 
two witnesses, and so on. See id. at 511-12. If the Constitution is to be praised for containing 
these provisions, then it cannot be the case that external limits are categorically unsuitable 
for the work at hand. The same point also undermines Hamilton’s first argument, of course. 
Given the express external limits on congressional power in Article I, Section 9, it is hard to 
take seriously the claim that the reason for omitting a Bill of Rights was that the specifica-
tion of external limits would dangerously imply that Congress could use its powers to do 
anything not affirmatively prohibited. If such an implication would arise from the specifica-
tion of external limits, it would arise from Section 9. Again, the point is obvious enough to 
make it seem likely that Hamilton understood the weakness of his own argument, as well as 
obvious enough to make it unremarkable for contemporary readers to have dismissed the 
idea as illogical and tendentious. 
162. See, e.g., James Wilson, Speech at the Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention (Nov. 24, 1787), in 
2 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 151, 
at 350, 355 (explaining that an enumeration had been chosen as the best means of demarcat-
ing the boundary between the authority of the national government and that of the states); 
James Wilson, Speech at the Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention (Nov. 26, 1787), in 2 EL-
LIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 154, at 424-25 (explaining that the Constitution enumerates Con-
gress’s powers because such an enumeration is a good way to ensure that the federal and 
state governments each maintain jurisdiction over matters that should be within their re-
spective authorities); James Wilson, Speech at the Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention (Oct. 
28, 1787), in 2 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 154, at 436-37 (arguing that enumerating the 
powers of government is a safer means of securing individual rights than enumerating the 
rights of individuals because the risk of an omission in the Constitution would then fall on 
the government rather than on individuals). 
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the enumeration.166 The point here is not, of course, that every statement about 
the enumeration by every important Founding figure clearly articulates a 
means-ends orientation. The Founders were many people saying many 
things—including, here and there, that the enumeration would not limit Con-
gress.167 The point is simply that understanding enumeration as a strategy ra-
ther than as a matter of independent normative value is true to an important 
way that many key Founders discussed the matter, such that characterizing the 
enumeration that way recovers a Founding-era conception rather than invent-
ing a new one. Had the Convention delegates believed that an enumeration 
would not help the new government strike a good balance between federal and 
state power, they might well have done without one. 
As things have turned out, the enumeration is not very helpful to the cause 
of striking such a balance. The internal-limits strategy has for a long time done 
little meaningful work. So it is fortunate that the Founders did not put all their 
eggs in the internal-limits basket. As already noted, the Convention was con-
cerned primarily with process limits, and the broader public insisted on addi-
tional external limits precisely because it did not trust the argument that inter-
nal ones would be adequate. Today, it is those other kinds of limits that do the 
work of protecting individual rights and preserving robust roles for state and 
local governance. The question, then, is whether fidelity requires modern deci-
 
163. See Edmund Randolph, Speech at the Virginia Ratifying Convention (June 17, 1788), in 3 
ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 154, at 463 (describing the enumeration as an effective mecha-
nism for the protection of individual liberties). 
164. See James Madison’s Notes from the Constitutional Convention (May 31, 1787), in 1 THE 
RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 150, at 53 (saying that the powers 
of Congress should be enumerated so as to prevent the vagueness of a more general course 
from resulting in excessive extension of those powers). 
165. See Roger Sherman & Oliver Ellsworth, Sherman and Ellsworth to the Governor of Connecticut 
(Sept. 26, 1787), in 3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 150, at 
99 (explaining that the enumeration was intended to preserve considerable autonomy for 
state decision making). 
166. The fifth member was Nathaniel Gorham of Massachusetts. I have been unable to locate 
sources in which Gorham addressed the rationale for the enumeration. For an excellent 
analysis of what can and cannot be known based on the surviving documentary evidence re-
garding the work of the Committee of Detail, see Ewald, supra note 145, at 259-69. 
167. See, e.g., Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, in 1 THE REPUBLIC OF LETTERS: 
THE CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN THOMAS JEFFERSON AND JAMES MADISON 1776-1826, at 513 
(James Morton Smith ed., 1995) (disbelieving Wilson’s public protestation that the enu-
meration would limit Congress’s powers); George Mason, Alterations Proposed (Aug. 31, 
1787), in SUPPLEMENT TO MAX FARRAND’S THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 
1787, at 251 (James H. Hutson ed., 1987); Edmund Randolph, Reasons for Not Signing the 
Constitution (Dec. 27, 1787), in 8 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE 
CONSTITUTION 260, 273 (John Kaminski & Gaspare Saladino eds., 1988). 
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sion makers to use a strategy that does not work particularly well when other 
strategies the Founding generation blessed are available to do the work better.  
The answer depends on whether there was an original commitment to the 
strategy as such, independent of its usefulness for achieving a set of goals. If so, 
fidelity to the Founders might require maintaining internal limits. But if not, 
modern decision makers can be perfectly faithful to the Founding design even 
if this particular strategy does no work at all, so long as they respect the com-
mitments that the Founders did make and use other mechanisms to protect 
federalism and individual rights. 
Consider the following hypothetical scenario as a relevantly parallel case. 
Charles’s last will and testament instructed his granddaughter Charlotte to use 
her inheritance to attend Radcliffe College. The will explained that this course 
of action was intended to help Charlotte achieve a financially secure adulthood. 
When Charles died in 1950, he had a clear expectation about the mechanism by 
which this strategy would succeed: Charlotte would meet and marry a Harvard 
man. But if Charlotte were to attend Radcliffe, and then law school, and then 
make a career as an attorney, she could both comply with her grandfather’s in-
struction and fulfill his ultimate purpose, whether or not she married rich, and 
whether or not attending Radcliffe had been a necessary step in the process. 
(Presumably she could have become a successful lawyer even if she had gone to 
college elsewhere.) 
Has Charlotte been faithful to her grandfather’s design? She used the mon-
ey to go to Radcliffe, not to tour Europe, and not even to attend Smith or 
Mount Holyoke or Bryn Mawr. She parlayed her education into a lucrative 
adulthood, rather than becoming a starving artist or a social worker or a mis-
sionary. So she both followed the specific directive in the will and achieved her 
grandfather’s articulated end. Without knowing more, that seems like enough 
to describe her actions as faithful to his design, even though the mechanism by 
which she achieved his end was different from the one he imagined. 
If we sense that Charlotte subverted her grandfather’s plan while adhering 
to its formal requirements, it is probably because we think that Charles under-
stood Charlotte’s marrying a wealthy man (or at least a man with good pro-
spects) as a matter of independent value—that he would not have been content 
for his granddaughter to find financial security by dint of her own career. One 
can certainly imagine Charles as having held that view. But we cannot establish 
that he held that view on the basis of his will, the text of which does not speak 
of Charlotte’s marriage. Nor would it settle the question if Charlotte reported 
that her grandfather had told her before his death that he hoped she would 
marry well. Maybe he was simply talking about what seemed to him a natural 
solution, given the world he knew, rather than specifying that no other solu-
tion would be acceptable. 
  
the limits of enumeration 
625 
 
In the absence of a clear showing that Charles regarded marriage as the in-
dispensable mechanism, it neither helps Charlotte nor flatters Charles to doubt 
that Charlotte adhered faithfully to the terms of her grandfather’s bequest. Af-
ter all, we cannot doubt Charlotte’s fidelity without casting Charles as unat-
tractively stubborn. If we remember Charles as a sensible man or even a wise 
one, we would attribute to him the understanding that he might not foresee 
everything about the future, as well as the desire for his granddaughter to do 
well in ways that made sense in light of the world she lived in, even if he would 
also want her to respect the terms of the gift he made. On that understanding, 
it would make sense to conclude that Charles would be satisfied with Char-
lotte’s decisions. She both adhered to the rule he laid down and realized the 
end that he wished for her. Not in exactly the way he expected, but in a way 
consistent with her obligations to him.  
I take it as given that Congress can legislate only on the basis of powers 
delegated to it under the Constitution, just as Charlotte must use her inher-
itance to attend Radcliffe rather than Smith. The text of each governing in-
strument makes that a rule.168 But unless the Founders were committed to 
overall internal limits as a matter of value rather than as a means to an end, fi-
delity does not require that internal limits be the mechanism limiting Congress 
any more than fidelity to Charles requires Charlotte’s marrying someone she 
met in college to be the mechanism by which she attains financial security. The 
question, then, is whether we should understand the Founders as committed to 
internal limits as a value-based matter rather than as a strategic one. Why, if at 
all, should we think that the Founders regarded the enumeration of internally 
limited powers as a mechanism that must do meaningful work in limiting Con-
gress, rather than as a mechanism they expected to do a fair amount of that 
work? 
In part for reasons that I will explain in more depth in Part IV, the answer 
cannot be the text of the Constitution. To be sure, the Tenth Amendment and 
the structure of Article I, Section 8 both imply that the Founders intended the 
enumerated powers as less than a general grant of regulatory authority. But 
neither text requires understanding that intention as a binding commitment 
for the construction of the enumerated powers, rather than as an expectation 
about how the system would function. Note that the Constitution in many re-
 
168. Or almost does. As careful readers have noticed for more than a century, the Tenth Amend-
ment may not quite say that the federal government can only act on the basis of powers del-
egated to it. It leaves open the possibility that the federal government can act on the basis of 
powers prohibited to the states, whether or not those powers are delegated to the federal 
government. See, e.g., TIEDEMAN, supra note 54. But that wrinkle does not affect the present 
argument. 
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spects reflects certain expectations without demanding that those expectations 
be made real. The Post Office Clause,169 for example, reflects the Founders’ ex-
pectation that people would communicate via written documents that would be 
physically carried from place to place. But no constitutional principle would be 
violated if that system of communication were to disappear at some point after 
the coming of the Internet. It would simply be the case that the Framers had 
certain expectations about how the system would function that turned out, af-
ter a time, to be at variance with the world’s actual conditions.170 So yes, (most 
of) the Framers expected the enumeration to help preserve state autonomy and 
protect individual rights. To adapt Chief Justice Marshall’s formula from Gib-
bons, they “presupposed” it,171 just as the Post Office Clause presupposed the 
utility of a postal system and just as Grandfather Charles presupposed that 
marriage was a woman’s ticket to financial comfort. Article I was written with 
the expectation that the enumerated powers would be limiting, and the Tenth 
Amendment was written with the expectation that the powers delegated to the 
United States would have narrower scope than a grant of general legislative 
power would. But as both the Post Office Clause and Grandfather Charles’s 
will illustrate, a text can be written in light of certain expectations without em-
bodying a demand that those expectations be realized.  
If it is not clear that the Founders thought of enumeration as more than a 
means to an end, then there are good reasons not to attribute that idea to them. 
First, and as noted above, leading Founders discussed the matter in instrumen-
tal terms.172 Second, an instrumental view of enumeration is more consistent 
with the image of the Founders as “practical statesmen, not metaphysical phi-
losophers.”173 The idea of enumeration as a means is straightforwardly practi-
cal: to protect state decision making and individual rights, give Congress only a 
limited set of powers. Finally, it bears remembering that one of the best mod-
ern value-based reasons for prizing the system of enumeration is one that 
 
169. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 7. 
170. At that point, the Post Office Clause might become either a provision without practical con-
sequence or, depending on how things worked out, a clause that acquired uses different 
from those that the Founders imagined. 
171. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 195 (1824). I say “adapt” because the enumeration 
to which Chief Justice Marshall referred in Gibbons was not the enumeration of congression-
al powers in the eighteen clauses of Article I, Section 8. It was the enumeration of three 
kinds of commerce in the third clause of Section 8. Id.  
172. Again, this is not to say that it is impossible to find statements from the Founding that seem 
to endow the enumeration with greater significance. But at the very least, the historical rec-
ord makes it hard to speak of a clear Founding commitment to treating the internal-limits 
approach as more than a means. 
173. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius (NFIB), 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2589 (2012). 
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would have had no purchase for the Founders. Today, affirming the role of the 
enumeration displays loyalty to a tradition we inherit, at least at the level of 
discourse and professed principle. The Founders approached the issue free of 
any such consideration. For them, authority and tradition did not much bear 
on how best to understand Congress, and their opportunity to confront the 
question as a matter of practical wisdom was commensurately greater.174 
If the Founders regarded enumeration largely as a practical strategy, then it 
matters when thinking about fidelity to the Founders that the enumeration 
strategy is not practical. Maybe it was practical once upon a time: internal lim-
its seemed175 meaningful in the Founders’ own lifetimes and for some period 
thereafter.176 But as the Founders foresaw, the system of internal limits could 
not be trusted to do the job by itself, and it has not worked well in a very long 
time. It shows no disrespect to the Founders to say that one of their strategies 
was effective for fewer than two hundred years, especially when we also re-
member that they were thoughtful enough to include other strategies that con-
tinue to be effective. Perhaps an undying commitment to a strategy that no 
longer works displays a certain kind of loyalty, but it is not a particularly help-
ful kind. Nor, assuming the Founders to have been reasonable and intelligent 
people, is it the kind of loyalty that the Founders would have wanted their suc-
cessors to show.  
On the generally warranted assumption that the leading Founders were so-
phisticated about human behavior, we should take for granted that they under-
stood that not all of their strategies would succeed forever in quite the way they 
 
174. The point here is not, of course, that the Founders confronted the world as if it were entirely 
new, rather than being in any way influenced by or even partial to traditions of which they 
approved. The point is more local: the Founders did not confront Congress as an institution 
steeped in tradition, nor did they inherit a pre-congressional tradition of describing a na-
tional legislature (say, Parliament) as a government of enumerated powers. Modern Ameri-
cans do inherit a tradition of describing Congress that way. 
175. I include this hedge to acknowledge the possibility that, even early in the history of the Re-
public, the real work of limitation was done by forces other than the limiting power of the 
enumeration. See supra Part II. 
176. Note that Charles’s strategy for Charlotte made sense at the time that he formulated it, just 
as the Founders’ expectation that internal limits would do meaningful work as part of the 
overall system of limits made sense in the 1780s. Only over time did Charles’s expected 
mechanism for ensuring Charlotte’s financial security become less likely to be the way in 
which that end was realized. Or to make the cases more parallel, imagine this variation: 
Charles dies in 1894 rather than 1950, leaving a large endowment and the instruction that 
his female descendants in each subsequent generation should use the proceeds to attend 
Radcliffe. For a while, the plan probably works—when it works—mostly in the way that 
Charles imagined. Eventually, some of Charles’s female descendants follow the instruction 
in a somewhat different way, and over time that different way becomes more and more the 
norm. 
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initially imagined. Their insistence on including external limits testifies to their 
recognition—or at least their suspicion—that enumeration might not be ade-
quate for checking Congress, either in their own day or in the foreseeable fu-
ture. And so long as external limits and process limits do the work of preserv-
ing state decision making and protecting individual rights, the system remains 
faithful to its Founding design. To say otherwise—to insist that the enumera-
tion do meaningful work even when other mechanisms get the job done—is to 
mistake the object of constitutional fidelity. It confuses a practical choice with a 
value choice and a tool with the purpose it is supposed to serve. 
iv .  text 
My argument about what fidelity to the Founding design requires should 
not be confused with a suggestion that modern decision makers are free to 
adopt any view of congressional power that is at some high level of generality 
consistent with the Founders’ wish that state and local governments wield con-
siderable decision-making authority. Constitutional law is more constraining 
than that; the Constitution frequently says what officials must do and how 
they must do it, rather than simply what their purposes must be. For example, 
the process for constitutional amendment under Article V requires the assent of 
three-fourths of the states, and we cannot interpret Article V to permit 
amendment with only three-fifths of the states, or with states whose combined 
populations comprise three-fourths of the national population whether or not 
those states also comprise three-fourths of the states, even if we decided that 
one of those alternatives would be a more sensible threshold for vindicating the 
Founders’ purposes in creating an amendment process than the one Article V 
now provides.177 Sometimes the text of the Constitution just prescribes rules, 
the contravention of which is unconstitutional. So even if neither federalism 
nor the vision of the Founders requires the internal-limits canon, the canon 
might still be mandatory in light of the text of the Constitution. 
In my view, the text of the Constitution does not so require. But as noted 
before, I am not arguing that the Constitution confers the equivalent of plenary 
power on Congress. It might, or it might not, depending on the best construc-
tions of many different powers and the relationship between those powers and 
the social world at any given time. My argument leaves room for disagreement 
 
177. This statement about interpretive impossibility means what such statements should always 
mean: not that it is impossible to imagine a clever reading yielding that interpretation, but 
that such an interpretation could not be persuasive to the community of constitutional prac-
titioners under any foreseeable circumstances. See Primus, Unbundling Constitutionality, su-
pra note 55, at 1102-04. 
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about the meaning of the Constitution’s power-conferring clauses, including 
the Commerce Clause. If it turned out that on the best reading of all of the 
powers, Congress possessed less than general regulatory authority, it would be 
true that the powers of Congress are subject to overall internal limits. But the 
conclusion would have been established without the influence of a fallacious 
rule—the internal-limits canon—forbidding any construction on which Con-
gress turned out to have plenary power in practice. My argument about the text 
of the Constitution takes no position on whether the sum total of Congress’s 
powers is equivalent in scope to a police power. Instead, my argument is that 
the text is best read to make the answer to that question a matter of contingen-
cy, rather than a categorical no. 
The traditional view is that Article I and the Tenth Amendment do require 
the categorical no that the internal-limits canon directs. From a certain per-
spective, those readings of the relevant texts are sensible. But what makes them 
sensible is the preconception that internal limits are necessary for maintaining 
federalism, for respecting the intentions of the Founders, or for some combina-
tion of the two.178 If those preconceptions were correct, then it would be easy to 
enlist the text in support. As I have already argued, however, those preconcep-
tions should be set aside. Without those preconceptions, neither Article I nor 
the Tenth Amendment requires that internal limits do meaningful work. 
A. The Tenth Amendment 
The Tenth Amendment reads as follows: “The powers not delegated to the 
United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are re-
served to the States respectively, or to the people.”179 This sentence is often 
read to confirm the idea that the powers of Congress are, collectively, less than 
a general grant of regulatory authority. The logic of that reading is easy to re-
construct. First, the Amendment speaks of “powers not delegated by the Con-
stitution to the United States,” which implies that there are such powers. Next, 
the Amendment directs that such powers (except those that are “prohibited . . . 
 
178. There is nothing unusual about this phenomenon: many constitutional interpretations are 
formed under the joint influence of several different kinds of constitutional reasoning. See 
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, 100 
HARV. L. REV. 1189, 1194-1209 (1987). If we have a correct understanding of the demands of 
federalism, for example, then it can make sense to read ambiguous text in the way that sup-
ports rather than undermines those demands. But if something in our thinking about feder-
alism is confused, it would be a mistake to let that confusion color our interpretation of the 
text, lest that unnecessary reading of the text later come to seem to us (or our successors) to 
be evidence that the Constitution forbids us to correct our thinking about federalism. 
179. U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
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to the States”) are “reserved to the States . . . or to the people,” meaning that 
they cannot be exercised by the federal government. Accordingly, the Tenth 
Amendment provides that Congress can exercise those powers delegated to the 
federal government and no others (again subject to the exception for powers 
prohibited to the states). Unless the Amendment states a rule with no applica-
tions, therefore, the powers delegated to the federal government must encom-
pass less than general regulatory authority. Assuming that an Amendment 
should not be interpreted to be devoid of applications, the principle that the 
powers of Congress are only a subset of all possible legislative powers is pre-
scribed by the Tenth Amendment. 
The first thing to notice about this argument is what it concedes: the prop-
osition that some powers must be withheld from Congress is not fully specified 
in the words of the Tenth Amendment. It rests also on an assumption about 
how the Tenth Amendment is supposed to operate. Everyone recognizes this 
feature of the reading, including the Supreme Court, even in some of its most 
state-protective moments. In New York v. United States, for example, the Court 
explained that the Tenth Amendment’s limit on the powers of Congress “is not 
derived from the text of the Tenth Amendment itself.”180 After all, the Tenth 
Amendment does not say, “The powers delegated to Congress must be con-
strued, collectively, as less than a grant of general jurisdiction.” Instead, the 
Tenth Amendment supplies a rule applicable in cases where the delegated 
powers would not authorize federal legislation, and we infer from the existence 
of such a rule that there must be limits to what the delegated powers can reach. 
We make that inference not because the words of the text require it but because 
of something we think we know about how such a text is supposed to operate. 
What we think we know is that constitutional clauses must have applications. 
People do not bother to amend constitutions with provisions that do no work. 
The foregoing argument traffics in an idea about the authors and ratifiers 
of the Tenth Amendment—specifically, that they must have meant their text to 
have applications. But the contention that it makes no sense to read the Tenth 
Amendment in a way that deprives its stated rule of all applications need not 
point to any evidence about the actual views of particular eighteenth-century 
Americans, other than whatever such evidence might be furnished by the 
Tenth Amendment itself. The idea that these words must have applications is 
an instance of an idea that might prevail in textual interpretation generally: 
that enacted texts should not be construed to have no meaning.181 Whatever we 
 
180. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 156 (1992). 
181. See, e.g., TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001) (“It is ‘a cardinal principle of statutory 
construction’ that ‘a statute ought, upon the whole, to be so construed that, if it can be pre-
vented, no clause, sentence, or word shall be superfluous, void, or insignificant.’” (quoting 
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know (or cannot know) about the Founders, this line of thinking maintains, it 
makes no sense to approach text in the Constitution as if it were meaningless. 
The fact that this argument is easily made based on a commonsense reading of 
the text alone probably accounts for some of its appeal. But whether we under-
stand the argument as “purely textual” or as some combination of textualist 
and originalist, the proposition that the Tenth Amendment’s words must have 
applications is a common idea about how that text must be read. And whichev-
er way we understand the argument, it has the same basic flaw. It confuses a 
proposition about the motivations of constitution-makers with a proposition 
about the functioning of constitutions. 
The confusion is easily stated. One can reasonably assume that people do 
not write rules that they know will never have applications. But it does not fol-
low that every rule people write has, or in the future will have, applications. 
Sometimes people write rules providing for situations that might arise, just in 
case. Sometimes the world turns out to be different from what the writers of a 
rule expected, such that an anticipated set of applications fails to materialize or 
dissolves over time. This last possibility is especially plausible for rules that 
remain in place for long periods of time, because the circumstances for which a 
rule was written might be characteristic of the world the authors knew but not 
of the world at all later times. So even if we assume that the authors of rules 
expect those rules to have applications, it would be a mistake to assume that 
every rule people write will turn out to have applications forever. To be sure, it 
is prudent, upon discovering that a rule has no applications, to ask whether the 
rule is being read correctly. But it is not at all prudent to take a discovery that a 
rule has no present applications as proof that the rule is being wrongly read. 
Consider an example that carries none of the baggage of debates about con-
stitutional theory. Imagine the Wolverine Summer Day Camp, located in 
southeastern Michigan and founded in 1970. The bylaws of the camp, adopted 
at the time of its founding, contain the following rule: “On days when the 
temperature is not forecast to exceed ninety degrees Fahrenheit, campers will 
spend the day outdoors.” It is reasonable to infer from the existence of this rule 
that the authors of the bylaws expected there to be some summer days with 
temperatures above ninety degrees and other summer days with maximum 
temperatures below ninety degrees. In a given year, however, it might turn out 
that the temperature was forecast to exceed ninety degrees on every day of the 
 
Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001))); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 
174 (1803) (“It cannot be presumed that any clause in the [C]onstitution is intended to be 
without effect . . . .”); see also Akhil Reed Amar, Constitutional Redundancies and Clarifying 
Clauses, 33 VAL. U. L. REV. 1, 2 (1998) (describing the strong tendency Amar observes among 
incoming law students to want to make every word in a legal document meaningful). 
  
the yale law journal 124:576   20 14  
632 
 
summer camping season. If that happened, the rule would have no applica-
tions. Campers might spend the entire summer inside, and if they did, the rule 
would not have been violated. (Whether the rule should be revised at that 
point is a separate question.) 
When the bylaws were adopted in 1970, it probably seemed far-fetched to 
think that southeastern Michigan could have a summer in which the tempera-
ture exceeded ninety degrees on every single day. But in 2014, it is easier to im-
agine that circumstance becoming a reality. Indeed, it is easier to imagine it be-
coming a reality on a permanent basis, or at least to imagine that days when the 
rule could be invoked would become exceedingly rare. If that happened, the 
rule would lie dormant. But it would not be violated. It would simply testify 
that the people who wrote the rule felt it important to address a situation that 
no longer presented itself. 
As a matter of textual interpretation, the Tenth Amendment is properly an-
alyzed in the same way. For a long time after its adoption in 1791, the text of 
the Amendment addressed a situation that arose in practice. Later, that situa-
tion dissolved, either entirely or nearly so. After that change in circumstances, 
the fact that the rule stated in the Tenth Amendment has virtually no applica-
tions does not mean that the Tenth Amendment is being violated. The rule 
simply does not come into play. It poses no problem for this understanding to 
say that the Founders must have expected the Amendment to have some func-
tion. Of course they did—and indeed, the Amendment’s stated rule did have 
applications when they wrote it. But there is no reason to think that a sensible 
construction of a text can only be one that ensures the text has applications al-
ways and forever. A clause can be perfectly worth adopting even if it only has 
consequences for a hundred years. 
It is worth being clear about two limits of the present argument, each of 
which concerns the subtle but crucial distinction between the text and the op-
erative content of a given constitutional provision. First, even if the rule stated 
in the text of the Tenth Amendment has no contemporary applications, it need 
not follow that the Tenth Amendment has no contemporary applications, be-
cause a constitutional provision as applied sometimes has force different from 
what an untutored reader of the text might expect.182 And indeed, I am not ar-
guing that the Tenth Amendment has no applications in modern constitutional 
law. As a matter of doctrine, the anticommandeering rule of New York v. United 
States183 and the sovereign-immunity rule of Alden v. Maine184 are applications 
 
182. The First Amendment applies against the executive branch, and uncontroversially so, de-
spite being textually addressed only to “Congress.” See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. United 
States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).  
183. New York, 505 U.S. at 155-57, 161. 
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of the Tenth Amendment, at least in part. These cases did not apply the rule 
stated in the text of the Tenth Amendment, as the Court in both cases 
acknowledged.185 They applied a related but not identical proposition about the 
value of state sovereignty, one that is best understood as arising from some 
combination of a theory of constitutional structure and a view of Founding-era 
history. Nonetheless, constitutional practice usually associates constitutional 
doctrines with particular clauses, even when the text of those clauses does not 
quite state the relevant doctrines.186 We unhesitatingly apply the First 
Amendment against the federal executive, despite its being addressed to “Con-
gress,” because we associate the First Amendment with the general idea that 
the government must respect the freedoms of speech and religion.187 There is a 
similar association between the Tenth Amendment and the general idea of state 
sovereignty as a limit on federal power, and that association allows Alden and 
New York to be classified as applications of the Tenth Amendment.188 
The Tenth Amendment rule that I have argued may have no present appli-
cations is the rule prescribed by the literal text of the Tenth Amendment, not 
the more robust rule invoked in Alden and New York. So if the Court has con-
strued the Tenth Amendment correctly, it remains true even today that the 
Amendment continues to do work. It just might not do the work of directing 
results in cases where Congress has enacted legislation exceeding the internal 
limits of its delegated powers, because that situation might no longer arise. In-
stead, the Tenth Amendment now has applications as a source of external limits 
on congressional power. New York and Alden limit what Congress can do under 
any of its Article I powers, and they do so on the basis of something outside of 
the enumeration rather than by the terms of any clause conferring power on 
Congress. Currently prevailing doctrine on commandeering and sovereign 
immunity is controversial, and I do not mean to take a position here on wheth-
er New York and Alden were rightly decided. But whatever the merits of these 
particular decisions, the existence of judicially enforceable external limits on 
congressional power is entirely consistent with the argument of this Article. 
My point about the Tenth Amendment is simply that its text does not compel 
the conclusion that there must be internal limits. 
 
184. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 713 (1999). 
185. Id.; New York, 505 U.S. at 155-57. 
186. Cf. Karl N. Llewellyn, The Constitution as an Institution, 34 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 4 (1934). 
187. See, e.g., New York Times Co., 403 U.S. 713. 
188. See, e.g., Seth Davis, Implied Public Rights of Action, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 67 (2014) (charac-
terizing New York as a Tenth Amendment case); Jamal Greene, What the New Deal Settled, 15 
U. PA. J. CONST. L. 265, 275 n.50 (2012) (linking Alden to the Tenth Amendment). 
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Second, I am not arguing that the Tenth Amendment cannot possibly be 
read to support the internal-limits canon. The text of the Tenth Amendment 
does not require the powers of Congress to be construed as internally limited, 
and in my view no sound principle of constitutional interpretation forbids 
reading that text to mean what it says. But again, it often happens that a con-
stitutional provision is taken to mean something different from what is stated 
in its text. The Tenth Amendment itself is a prominent example, as just dis-
cussed: the Supreme Court already takes that provision to embody a proposi-
tion of federalism that is related to, rather than contained within, its text.189 So 
if the substantive idea that the powers of Congress must be construed as inter-
nally limited is a valid constitutional principle—because federalism requires it, 
or because the Founders’ intentions require it, or for any other reason—then it 
would be consistent with the way American constitutional interpretation works 
to read the Tenth Amendment to represent that idea. But if neither federalism 
nor fidelity requires the powers of Congress to have meaningful internal limits, 
then there is no reason to (mis)read the Amendment as making such limits 
mandatory. On its own, the text of the Tenth Amendment contains no such 
rule. 
B. Article I 
The other main textual arguments for the necessity of internal limits focus 
on Article I, Section 8.190 Again, the relevant arguments are not close readings 
 
189. See, e.g., New York, 505 U.S. at 156-57 (acknowledging that the text of the Tenth Amend-
ment does not contain the relevant rule). The Eleventh Amendment is another example. See 
Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996) (“Although the text of the Amend-
ment would appear to restrict only the Article III diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts, 
‘we have understood the Eleventh Amendment to stand not so much for what it says, but 
for the presupposition . . . which it confirms.’” (quoting Blatchford v. Native Village of 
Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 779 (1991))). 
190. It is also possible to advance a textual argument based on Article I, Section 1, which says, 
“All legislative powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, 
which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1. The 
words “herein granted” might imply the existence of other legislative powers not granted, 
and that implication could draw support from the contrast with the language of the Vesting 
Clauses of Articles II and III, neither of which uses the “herein granted” language and which 
can therefore be read to indicate that the use of that language in Article I was purposeful. See 
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1 (“The executive power shall be vested . . . .”); U.S. CONST. art. III, 
§ 1 (“The judicial power of the United States, shall be vested . . . .”). It is hard to evaluate 
the strength of this interpretation as a purely textual matter. The “herein granted” language 
will bear the meaning described here, but that is not the only meaning it will bear, and the 
contrast with the other Vesting Clauses might bespeak the intention described, and it also 
might not. Even if read for all it might be worth, though, the Vesting Clause would demon-
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of the several power-conferring clauses of Section 8, deployed in combination 
(and in combination with readings of the Constitution’s many other clauses 
conferring power on Congress) to show that the sum total of the powers leaves 
Congress unable to legislate on some set of topics. That kind of argument 
might or might not be successful. But even if such an argument successfully re-
vealed limits on Congress’s overall power to legislate, it would not be germane 
to the validity of the internal-limits canon. The canon is a rule for construing 
the powers of Congress (“Under no circumstances may you read these powers 
such that they end up covering all possible subjects of legislation”), not a de-
scription of something that one would discover after construing the powers 
without the influence of that rule (“Hey, I read all these grants of power and 
thought about what they add up to collectively, and it turns out that they don’t 
exhaust all possible subjects of legislation”). A textual argument for the inter-
nal-limits canon would have to support the rule itself in a way conceptually 
prior to the interpretation and summation of many individual powers. And 
since nothing in Article I states the internal-limits canon directly, the Article I 
arguments for the internal-limits canon are not close readings of particular 
constitutional passages. They are readings of the structure of Section 8, consid-
ered as a whole. 
To be precise, there are two textual arguments from Article I, both building 
from the foundation that Section 8 confers a long list of particular powers. 
First, there is the argument against generality. That argument, in short, is that 
it makes no sense to read a list of particular powers as equivalent to a grant of 
general power, because a list of specifics is a strange way to denote something 
general. If Article I were designed to confer general legislative power, it could 
just say so.191 Second, there is the argument against redundancy. This argument 
holds that it makes no sense to read one power in a list of powers—say, the 
commerce power—so expansively that its scope approaches that of a police 
power. To do so would make most of the rest of the list redundant. And it is 
 
strate only that the Founders intended for the powers listed in Section 8 to be less than a 
grant of general jurisdiction, and we knew that already. The Clause does not tell us that they 
regarded that fact about Section 8 as having value independent of its instrumental tendency 
to protect state decision making and individual rights, nor does it by its terms preclude the 
possibility that the granted powers would turn out to reach more subjects of potential regu-
lation than the Founders initially anticipated. 
191. For one set of contrasting views on the merits of this argument, compare Kurt T. Lash, 
“Resolution VI”: The Virginia Plan and Authority to Resolve Collective Action Problems Under 
Article I, Section 8, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2123 (2012), which supports the traditional view 
that the enumeration’s list of particulars should not be read as a general power, with Robert 
D. Cooter & Neil S. Siegel, Collective Action Federalism: A General Theory of Article I, Section 8, 
63 STAN. L. REV. 115, 123 (2010), which supports the opposite view. 
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odd, this argument maintains, to construe a text with eighteen different clauses 
in a way that makes most of those clauses superfluous.192 
The two arguments have much in common, including the assumption that 
a reasonable inference about how a text was expected to function is also a rea-
sonable inference about how the text will function. That assumption is out of 
place here, just as it was with respect to the Tenth Amendment. 
Consider first the argument against generality. Chief Justice Marshall’s dic-
tum that an enumeration presupposes something not enumerated is tradition-
ally mobilized to support this idea: a specific list is something that people write 
when they want to distinguish those things that are on the list from other 
things that are not on the list.193 The basic logic here is that of the familiar in-
terpretive canon expressio unius est exclusio alterius: the specification of one thing 
is the exclusion of another. As a general matter, expressio unius is a sensible in-
terpretive intuition, so long as it is treated as rebuttable where the particulars 
so direct. So it is easy to note that the Constitution provides a long list of spe-
cific congressional powers, recite expressio unius, quote Chief Justice Marshall, 
and rest confident in the view that the internal-limits canon must be correct.194  
But things are not so simple. For starters, this thought process bundles the 
enumeration principle and the internal-limits canon closely together and in so 
doing obscures a slippery transition between two steps of reasoning. The first 
step, which is the one that corresponds to the enumeration principle, goes like 
this: the Constitution specifies many powers of Congress, and we take that to 
mean that Congress may act only on the basis of those powers. But the second 
 
192. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 589 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) (making 
this argument). 
193. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 195 (1824) (“The enumeration presupposes some-
thing not enumerated.”); see also Regan, supra note 8, at 556 (“The mere fact of an enumera-
tion of powers makes it clear that the federal government’s powers are meant to be lim-
ited.”). 
194. As noted in Part I.A, supra, there is some question about whether Congress has only those 
powers that the Constitution literally enumerates or whether it also has powers that are del-
egated without being enumerated in the literal sense. The expressio unius argument would 
apply in somewhat different form depending on which perspective one adopted. If the pow-
ers of Congress are all enumerated in the literal sense, the expressio unius argument provides 
that the enumeration of certain powers implies the denial of all powers not enumerated. If 
“enumerated” is a term of art that includes powers delegated even though not expressly 
spelled out, the expressio unius argument provides that the enumeration of certain powers 
implies that not every power is given. Readers who take seriously the case law identifying 
some congressional powers as unenumerated will be drawn to one form, and readers who 
take literally the familiar axiom that the federal government is one of enumerated powers 
will be drawn to the other. Either way, though, the idea is that the Constitution would not 
separately identify the many different powers of Congress if Congress were in fact empow-
ered to do everything that a general legislative power would enable it to do. 
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step is more problematic. It is the inference that the powers specified cannot 
authorize any and all legislation that Congress might pass under the circum-
stances of a given time. That second step is the one that purports to establish 
the internal-limits canon, and it does not follow automatically from the step 
before, because there is no general rule by which all enumerations of authority 
must exclude some action that the authorized party might take. 
Suppose that I am leaving instructions for a friend who will stay in my 
house while I am on vacation. I might write as follows: “You can use my show-
er, or you can use the kids’ shower, or you can use the guest shower.” If my 
house has three showers, then this enumeration does not limit my friend’s 
choices at all, and I do not intend it to. If my friend has a certain sort of analytic 
mind, he might read the list, notice that the house has only three showers, and 
wonder why I bothered to write a longer sentence than “You can use any 
shower in the house.” But if he also has basic common sense, he will not long 
be bothered by the question, because he will generate perfectly adequate expla-
nations. Maybe I wrote the list that way to make sure he knows what all of his 
options are. Or maybe I thought that giving permission to use the showers in 
general might still leave him wondering whether I preferred that he use a par-
ticular one, so it made sense to emphasize his equal privilege to use any of the 
three. 
The enumeration of powers in Article I differs from the shower enumera-
tion in that the powers granted in Article I were not intended to be exhaustive. 
When I list all three showers in my house, I know that I am conferring authori-
ty that is in practice as broad as the authority I would confer by writing, “Use 
any shower you like.” And I take it as given that the Founders—or most of 
them, anyway195—understood the enumeration to give Congress less authority 
than a general police power would. To appropriate the terms of the Gibbons 
dictum, they presupposed something not enumerated. But it is important to 
think carefully about what it means to presuppose. A presupposition is an as-
sumption, but it is not always a requirement. The bylaws of the Wolverine 
Summer Day Camp presupposed summer days with temperatures below nine-
ty degrees; Grandfather Charles presupposed that Charlotte’s financial welfare 
 
195. Some leading figures read the grants of congressional power as tantamount to general legis-
lative authority. See supra Part III. The fact that this interpretation was sometimes offered to 
criticize the Constitution rather than to praise it has little bearing on whether it is an inter-
pretation that the text will support. The point is merely that the existence of Founding-era 
figures who read the enumeration as other than limiting is in tension with the idea that the 
fact of enumeration necessarily betokens limitation. To be sure, the people who read the 
Constitution as granting Congress something tantamount to general legislative authority 
may not have read the text in the best possible way. But whether they did or not, we must 
reckon with the fact that some participants in the process considered this reading correct. 
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as an adult would be a function of her marriage. But neither the camp bylaws 
nor Charles’s will required that those presuppositions actually describe the 
world of the future, and indeed the idea of imposing such requirements would 
be nonsensical. The point, of course, is that because the authors of texts are not 
omniscient about the circumstances in which those texts will be applied, textu-
al rules are sometimes applied in situations that lack some of the features that 
the authors presupposed. But textual rules often make sense even when some 
of their authors’ presuppositions turn out to be inapplicable, such that imple-
menting the rules as written would still vindicate the purposes for which they 
were adopted. 
Imagine that the Simpsons run out of milk. Marge sends Homer to the 
Kwik-E-Mart with a note that says, “Here are the kinds of milk you may buy: 
2%, 1%, and skim. Do not buy any milk that is not on this list.” It is clear that 
Homer is not supposed to buy whole milk, or chocolate milk, or Duff-brand 
beer milk. But if Homer arrives at the Kwik-E-Mart and finds the place sold 
out of all milk other than 2%, 1%, and skim, he may buy any kind of milk in the 
store. He should not say, “Well, the shopping list clearly communicates to me 
that I can’t buy just any milk in the store. If I were authorized to buy any milk 
in the store, it wouldn’t make sense for the shopping list to be written as an 
enumeration of specific authorized purchases. So let me figure out what I must 
refrain from buying.” Instead, Homer should understand that the list is written 
the way it is because Marge had an expectation—a presupposition—that was 
not borne out in practice. And he should carry out his shopping just as he 
would have, on these facts, if the shopping list had said, “Buy any milk in the 
store”—not because Marge authorized Homer to buy any and all milk, but be-
cause in the applicable circumstances the scope of the limited authorization she 
gave does not exclude any practically available course of action.196 
None of these examples is exactly like Article I. But they should dispel the 
idea that sound textual interpretation necessarily precludes reading an enumer-
ation of particular powers to have the same effect as a grant of general power. 
In the absence of some reason extrinsic to the text to read the enumeration as 
limiting, the fact that the text is written as an enumeration does not require 
reading it that way. 
To be sure, such extrinsic reasons might exist. But establishing the exist-
ence of such a reason would require reference to something beyond the text, 
and it is not clear what that something would be. For reasons described in Part 
II, the demands of American federalism do not furnish such a reason, because 
internal limits are neither necessary nor particularly helpful for a healthy feder-
 
196. For pushing me on this example, I thank Romana Primus. I also thank her for buying me a 
lot of milk. 
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al structure. For reasons described in Part III, a desire to be faithful to the 
Founding design does not furnish such a reason either. And in the absence of a 
good reason to treat the presupposition as a condition for the exercise of the 
rule, there is no reason to read the text as contemplating a smaller grant of 
power to Congress than its words indicate. Whether the power-granting texts 
are properly read to confer less power in practice than would flow from a gen-
eral grant of authority depends on the real-world relationship between the 
powers granted and the circumstances under which Congress acts. 
Consider next the argument against redundancy. It is reasonable to pre-
sume that people writing lists of rules do not intend most of those rules to be 
redundant. But that is a far cry from saying that a reading on which some rules 
are redundant is necessarily a misreading of the text. Some documents include 
redundancies for the same reasons that speech includes redundancies. Some-
times redundancies are unintentional: writers, like speakers, are not always 
precise. And sometimes redundant words are included intentionally, perhaps 
for emphasis rather than for substantive meaning. (Under Article II, Section 1, 
the President swears to “preserve, protect and defend the Constitution.”197 
These are not three separate duties that the President undertakes.) Moreover, 
the Constitution was written by many people working partly in cooperation 
and partly at cross-purposes, and anyone who has drafted a complex document 
in a large committee knows that spare and elegant composition is often costly 
to obtain. (“I know that § 12(g) is unnecessary in light of § 4(a), but Johnson is 
attached to § 12(g), so I’ll keep my mouth shut so we can keep working.”) To 
be sure, if one’s reading of a text causes parts of the text to do no work, it is 
wise to consider whether a different reading might be better. But the conclu-
sion that parts of a text are simply redundant cannot be categorically exclud-
ed.198 If you doubt it, try for the next twenty-four hours to read every text you 
see as if it had no unnecessary clauses. Try to read just one carefully edited law 
review article that way.  
Once the general point that even carefully crafted texts have redundancies 
is recognized, it is easy to spot redundancies in the Constitution—and not only 
in the clause specifying the Presidential Oath. Consider Article I, Section 8, 
Clause 6, which states that Congress has the power to provide for the punish-
 
197. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1. 
198. I take this approach to reflect the best reading of Chief Justice Marshall’s famous statement 
that “[i]t cannot be presumed that any clause in the Constitution is intended to be without ef-
fect[.]” Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 174 (1803) (emphasis added). Interpret-
ers should not presume that the drafters intended redundancy. But a presumption against in-
tended redundancy can be overcome, and sometimes texts are in fact redundant even when 
not intended as such. 
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ment of counterfeiting the securities and current coin of the United States.199 
What does this clause add to the clauses granting Congress the power to issue 
securities and coin in the first place? Do we think that in the absence of Clause 
6 Congress could coin money but would be powerless against counterfeiters? 
That seems unlikely, both because it seems contrary to common sense and be-
cause it is sharply at odds with the way other parts of Section 8 are read. No 
constitutional clause expressly grants Congress the power to punish people 
who fail to pay their taxes, or people who violate copyrights, but nobody 
doubts that Congress has those punishment powers, whether as inherent inci-
dents of the underlying powers to tax200 and to grant copyrights201 or as means 
necessary and proper for carrying those powers into execution.202 If the Consti-
tution did not expressly specify congressional power to punish counterfeiting, 
the power would be there just the same, exactly as it is for all parallel congres-
sional powers. So Clause 6 does no independent work. 
One could reasonably accept all of the foregoing points and still think that 
reading the Commerce Clause as a grant of nearly general regulatory authority 
creates too much redundancy to be credible. In other words, the causes of re-
dundancy that I identify above might explain a bit of extraneous text here and 
there, but they cannot plausibly explain why most of a text—here, most of the 
eighteen clauses of Section 8—is extraneous. That may be. But for reasons that 
largely overlap with the reasons why a set of enumerated powers can turn out 
to be indistinguishable in practice from a grant of general authority, the 
amount of a document that can reasonably be read as redundant can change as 
the circumstances in which the document is applied change. 
Distinguish, therefore, between original redundancy and acquired redun-
dancy. Original redundancy is redundancy that exists in a document on the day 
the document is written. For the reasons given above, the best reading of a 
document might find a bit of original redundancy. That said, it would be 
strange for a document—or at least a document that is intended as a carefully 
crafted and practically operative set of rules—to contain enormous redundan-
cies as an original matter. Acquired redundancy, however, is the redundancy 
that exists in practice when the document is applied at some later time, after 
relevant conditions have changed. Imagine, for example, a New York game-
preservation statute adopted in 1800 and providing as follows: “No deer shall 
be killed (1) within one day’s overland travel from Albany; or (2) within one 
 
199. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 6. 
200. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 
201. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
202. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. 
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day’s overland travel from New York City.” (The drafters figured that protect-
ing deer near large population centers would reduce nonessential hunting and 
preserve a food supply needed in rural areas.) The statute contains little if any 
original redundancy. In 1800, most or even all places that lay within one day’s 
overland travel of one of those cities were not within one day’s overland travel 
of the other. Today, however, the two rules would be completely redundant. 
Or consider a treaty between Britain and France, signed in 1820, providing that 
neither country would maintain a naval presence “off the coast of the United 
States, or that of Texas.” After 1845, the second provision would be completely 
redundant. But it would be a mistake at that point to read the treaty as if the 
second provision carried some meaning not entirely contained within the first. 
A reading of Article I, Section 8 on which the list of enumerated powers 
were shot through with original redundancies would likely be a bad reading. 
There is language here and there that could have been removed without chang-
ing the substantive import of the section even in 1787,203 but by and large it is 
reasonable to think that the drafters expected the several enumerated powers to 
do different things. It is perfectly plausible, however, to think that the enumer-
ated powers might feature a great deal of acquired redundancy.  
This is not to say that change over time necessarily justifies reading consti-
tutional language as redundant. How much redundancy the Commerce Clause 
creates in the rest of Section 8 depends on how broadly the Commerce Clause 
applies, and as already noted I am not arguing for any particular construction 
of that Clause. I am simply pointing out that the appropriate constructions of 
the enumerated powers, whatever they might be, need not be limited to avoid 
redundancy. The idea that every piece of a text must be construed to carry its 
own distinctive meaning may arise from a well-intentioned effort to have the 
text make sense as a whole, but the principle of interpretation that such an ef-
fort seeks to vindicate is simply misplaced.204 If a reading produces redundan-
 
203. See, e.g., text accompanying supra note 199. In a slightly different vein but with the same 
import, the power to create tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court, granted in Clause 9, 
was from the beginning redundant in light of Article III, Section 1, which gives Congress the 
power to create inferior courts. 
204. Perhaps the impulse to attribute some consequential import to every clause of the Constitu-
tion arises from the same sorts of venerative attitudes animating the idea that there is mean-
ing to be found in every single word of the Bible, the Koran, and similar religious texts. But 
there are, or ought to be, obvious differences in the appropriate hermeneutic assumptions 
for these different enterprises. Biblical interpretation applying the principle that every word 
in the document is meaningful presumes an infallible author, one who does not need to ne-
gotiate clauses with Johnson and who is omniscient about the circumstances of the future as 
well as those of the present. Whether approaching the Constitution with parallel assump-
tions is merely untenable or also blasphemous is a question that different people will answer 
differently. 
  
the yale law journal 124:576   20 14  
642 
 
cies, it is worth thinking twice about whether one is reading correctly. But if 
one can give a reasonable account of the redundancy in question, and if the 
reading otherwise makes sense, there is no good reason to rule out readings 
simply because they make certain pieces of text extraneous. 
For all these reasons, the text of Article I, Section 8 does not require the in-
ternal-limits canon. To be sure, there is an available reading of that text that 
would support the idea that the enumeration is limiting if there were good ex-
tratextual reasons to understand the enumeration that way. Much the same is 
true of the text of the Tenth Amendment. But in the absence of good extratex-
tual reasons for the internal-limits canon, the text of the Constitution does not 
require it. 
conclusion 
For a long time, constitutional law has featured a stable paradox whereby 
courts articulated the internal-limits canon but permitted Congress to legislate 
as it thought proper, within the external limits of constitutional law. It is not 
clear whether that arrangement will remain stable. If it will not, the choice is 
between revising our practice to match a theory and revising that theory to 
match our practice. In my view, the practice is sensible and should prevail. In 
that respect, my argument is conservative, in the classical or Burkean sense: it 
seeks to defend the stability of a longstanding practice against the threat posed 
by reformers wielding an abstraction. As measured by the conventions of con-
stitutional discourse, my argument is radical, because it recommends the aban-
donment of a traditionally orthodox idea. It is the radicalism of looking at what 
we are already doing, indeed at what we have done for a long time, and decid-
ing to be at peace. 
 
